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PARADIGMS OF RESTRAINT
ERIN MURPHY†
ABSTRACT
Incapacitation of dangerous individuals has conventionally
entailed the exercise of physical control over an actual body: the state
confines the person in jail. But advances in technology have changed
that convention. A variety of new technologies—such as GPS tracking
bracelets, biometric scanners, online offender indexes, and DNA
databases—give the government power to control dangerous persons
without relying on any exertion of physical control. The government
can track the location of a person in real time, receive remote
notification that an individual has ingested alcohol, or electronically
zone someone into a home or out of a public park. It can prove
conclusively that a particular person wore a hat or took a sip from a
discarded soda can, or identify a single face in a ten thousand–person
crowd. In this day and age, restraint of the dangerous can be as much
about keeping people out of a place as it used to be about locking
them up in one.
But whereas physical incapacitation of dangerous persons has
always invoked some measure of constitutional scrutiny, virtually no
legal constraints circumscribe the use of its technological counterpart.
Across legal doctrines, courts erroneously treat physical deprivations
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as the archetypal “paradigm of restraint,” and thus largely overlook
the significant threat to liberty posed by technological measures.
Similarly, little academic attention has been paid to the state’s use of
targeted forms of non-physical control. Much scholarly interest has
focused on the increased use of physical incapacitation as a means of
exerting regulatory control over, for example, illegal immigrants,
pretrial detainees, or the mentally ill. And an equally vibrant debate
surrounds the protection of information privacy in general society.
Yet nearly no attention has been paid to the connection between these
two developments.
This Article examines the generally unheeded intersection between
two well-documented trends: the state’s increasing desire to
preventively regulate targeted classes of individuals, and its increasing
capacity to use innovative technologies, rather than physical
incapacitation, to realize that desire. This Article identifies four
loosely grouped emerging technologies of control: DNA databasing,
electronic monitoring, electronic indexing, and biometric scanning. It
then reviews the legal landscape on which they operate and
demonstrates that, across the range of doctrines, courts unduly focus
on the physical world as the relevant metric against which all
restraints are judged. As a result, technologies of restraint are imposed
without necessary procedural safeguards. This Article then outlines
four concerns peculiar to these kinds of restraints and illustrates how
significant concerns are wholly overlooked when the physical world is
the determinant referent of comparison. The Article closes by urging
greater judicial scrutiny of technological restraint and by laying out a
series of potential inquiries that might aid in such an effort.
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INTRODUCTION
Everybody understands, or at least has a glimmering
understanding of, what it means to go to jail. Whether from popular
media or personal experience, most people imagine imprisonment as
the strongest and most singular instrument of state power. And who,
accordingly, would not trade nearly anything to avoid incarceration?
Faced with a choice between prison and house arrest, global
positioning system (GPS) tracking, or even public humiliation, who
would not choose any—or even all—of the latter? But reconsider that
trade-off when detailed more precisely: for instance, one day in jail
versus having to fill out a form at a government office downtown after
every hairstyle change or car rental; one week in jail versus a lifetime
of GPS tracking; or one month in jail versus never being able to
reside in or visit—for any reason—any major American city.
Suddenly prison may no longer seem the state’s only means of
restricting liberty that merits serious consideration.
Physical incarceration has long served as the primary means of
1
incapacitating persons found guilty of committing criminal offenses.

1. For an interesting history of the crime-tort distinction, see David J. Seipp, The
Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 83–87
(1996).
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Not surprisingly then, it is a power checked and monitored in
multifarious ways; a litany of enumerated, entrenched procedural
rules circumscribes the use of incarceration as a punitive sanction for
2
wrongdoing in the American legal system. Of course, a criminal
conviction is not the only lawful means by which the state imprisons
individuals. The state also has at its disposal an array of civil measures
for preventive incapacitation of “all of those whom we know (or think
we know) to pose a danger of serious harm to others,”3 including

2. Before a person may be jailed for a criminal offense, the U.S. Constitution provides
generally for “due process of law,” U.S. CONST. amend. V, including specific entitlements to
“presentment or indictment,” id., a “speedy and public trial,” an “impartial jury,” notice of the
“nature and cause of the accusation,” a right to confront witnesses, compulsory process, and the
assistance of counsel, id. amend. VI. The state cannot punish individuals for acts previously held
lawful, impose duplicative penalties, id. amend. V, or impose sanctions considered cruel and
unusual, see id. amend. VIII; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & 535 n.16 (1979). The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause applies, as its title suggests, only to “punishments.” Id. at 535 n.16
(noting that the Eighth Amendment applies only after punishment is imposed, and thus
concerns about the incarceration conditions of pretrial detainees are properly addressed as due
process matters that ask whether the conditions have matured into “punishments” under a
Mendoza-Martinez test). Moreover, criminal punishment can be meted out only after the
government, bearing the burden of proof, overcomes the presumption of innocence and proves
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest standard in the law. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). Although it was not until the midcentury that many due process rights were formally
incorporated against the states via the Due Process Clause, some scholars argue that
incorporation had a less profound effect on states than commonly believed, because many states
nonetheless provided for a range of procedural entitlements. See, e.g., Kenneth Katkin,
“Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The View from the States, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 397, 411–12 (2005) (cataloguing incorporated rights, comparing them to contemporary
state constitutional practice, and concluding that “points of disagreement [were] often narrow
and technical”).
3. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 819 (1997). See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL 128 (2001) (“The new criminologies tend to view crime prospectively
and in aggregate terms, for the purpose of calculating risks and shaping preventative
measures.”); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE 169 (1993) (discussing the “new control
model around risk management” in parole supervision); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon,
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (describing the shift from an “old penology” founded in findings
of “responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the
individual offender” to a “new penology” based in efforts to “identify, classify, and manage
groupings sorted by dangerousness”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection:
Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent
Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 81–82 (1996) (analyzing and advocating for a
distinction between civil and criminal processes); Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the
Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121 (2005) [hereinafter Slobogin, Civilization] (arguing in
favor of a shift from the corrective to the preventive model of criminal law); Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275 (2006) (discussing the merits
of predictive calculations of danger).
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4
5
commitment of the mentally ill, certain illegal immigrants, pretrial
6
7
defendants, violent sexual predators, and terrorist suspects.8
Although fewer rules circumscribe the “civil” or “regulatory” forms
9
of physical incapacitation, in many cases the standards closely
approximate those required for penal sanctions.
But if penal incapacitation constitutes the first system of social
10
protection and civil regulatory incapacitation the second, then a
third system is emerging—the preventive state has become a
technological one. The dawn of the twenty-first century witnessed an
explosion in technologies such as GPS tracking bracelets, biometric
scanners, online offender indexes, and DNA databases—all adopted
as a means of controlling and regulating a particular subset of the
population without exerting physical control. Technology permits the
government to physically track large numbers of persons in real

4. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (upholding a civil commitment statute
and noting that the reasonable doubt standard is not constitutionally required).
5. The Supreme Court initially rejected the constitutionality of detaining all deportable
aliens. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting indefinite detention
of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”). The Court, however, then upheld
detention of a limited class of aliens without requiring individualized determinations of
dangerousness. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 557–58 (2003) (“Detention is not limited to
dangerous criminal aliens or those found likely to flee, but applies to all aliens claimed to be
deportable for criminal convictions, even where the underlying offenses are minor.”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (upholding an act that
allowed for the pretrial detention of “arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found
after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community”).
7. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997) (“When the State has
‘disavowed any punitive intent’; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly
dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; afforded the same status as others
who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted
immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally
impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.”).
8. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion) (allowing
detention of a citizen captured on foreign soil based on less than that which should be required
for the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant).
9. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 70–78 (describing different ways in which states
have authorized the indefinite civil confinement of mentally ill and dangerous individuals upon
fewer procedural protections than that required for criminal confinement); cf. Franklin E.
Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901,
1903 (1992) (“Heightened protection in civil cases usually occurs in situations that involve the
risk of secure confinement, such as juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction and involuntary civil
commitment under the mental health powers, or the loss of personal associations, such as child
custody.”).
10. Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 80.
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11
time; to prove conclusively which person wore a hat or took a sip
from a discarded soda can;12 to electronically zone an individual into
or out of designated spaces,13 or perhaps even to isolate and identify a
14
single face in a ten thousand–person crowd. Regulation of the
dangerous, in a technologically advanced society, has become as
much about keeping a person out of a place as it used to be about
locking a person up in one.
But whereas a rich debate explores the potential for abuse of
physical incapacitation, whether as a matter of criminal sanction or
15
“regulatory” control, a corresponding dialogue surrounding the risks
posed by nonphysical, technology-based means of control is
conspicuously lacking. Essentially no legal structures superintend the
use of noncorporeal means of incapacitation, even though their use
raises many of the concerns manifest in the use of physical restraints,
and even as the advent of technological alternatives has diminished
the government’s need to rely on conventional forms of
incapacitation.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the generally unheeded
intersection of two well-documented trends: the state’s increasing
desire to preventively regulate specified individuals and its increasing
ability to use innovative technologies, rather than physical
incapacitation, to realize that desire. Many scholars have observed
that the government and private entities routinely collect and store

11. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467–68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
(upholding the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices).
12. See, e.g., State v. Piro, 112 P.3d 831, 834 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the DNA
testing of a water bottle retained by officers after defendant was offered a drink while in
custody).
13. See, e.g., Cara Buckley, New York Plans Surveillance Veil for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2007, at A1 (describing a New York City plan to install cameras linked to license plate
databases that could trigger barriers if cars banned from the area passed nearby).
14. See, e.g., Eyeticket Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532–34 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(describing potential uses of iris scanning technology); People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587,
597–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing potential uses of facial recognition software); David
Lamb, One Last City is Scanning for Faces in the Crowd, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at A10
(reporting that Virginia Beach continues to use facial-recognition systems to scan for terrorists,
felons with outstanding warrants, and missing children).
15. Compare Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 96 (arguing that civil commitment should serve
only as a “gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal process cannot address”), with
Slobogin, Civilization, supra note 3, at 165 (arguing for a “preventive regime” of criminal law
that would collapse the “artificial distinctions between civil and criminal dispositions” in
appropriate cases).
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16
large quantities of data about individuals in society. But none have
focused on the concerns unique to the use of technological means of
exercising control over specified persons or populations, in particular
17
those deemed by the state to be “dangerous,” in order to regulate or
control them. That is, this Article does not concentrate on “open
systems” of technological surveillance that monitor generally or
18
indiscriminately without focusing ab initio on particular suspects.
Rather, this Article is concerned with “‘closed system[s]’ of
surveillance” that either specifically target a particular subject or else
operate indiscriminately but with reference to “a relevant archive that
can be searched.”19 In short, this Article focuses not on the
intersection camera that catches anyone running a red light but rather
on the intersection camera connected to a database of felon license
plates that isolates and identifies only those particular cars.20
In this respect, the literature surrounding general issues of
privacy with regard to new technologies places into sharper relief the
issues that nonphysical forms of surveillance and control bring to the
fore. At the same time, the literature surrounding regulatory

16. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815
(2000) (arguing for more nuanced regulations of Internet privacy); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999) (detailing the extent to which
personal information is collected online and proposing rules for fair practice); Daniel J. Solove,
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083
(2002) (noting myriad ways in which the government can gather information without suspicion)
[hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001)
(reconceptualizing the problem of Internet privacy in power and dignity terms rather than in
embarrassment or self-censorship terms).
17. In particular, my concern is with the “reconfiguration of the practices that we most
associate with disciplinary society—that is, panoptic surveillance aimed at intervening in the
social world to provide an effective treatment for defective behaviour . . . to a type of
surveillance which is essentially concerned with the ‘management’ of those already deemed
criminal.” Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Circuits of Surveillance, 2 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y
1, 11 (2004).
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. Many technologies indiscriminately amass or collate information—it is estimated, for
example, that over five hundred thousand cameras monitor the streets of London, and one
study suggested that a single person is filmed roughly three hundred times a day. Steve
Stecklow, Jason Singer & Aaron O. Patrick, Watch on the Thames: Surveillance Cameras
Monitor Much of Daily Life in London, May Help Identify Bombers, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005,
at B1. Such “open system” forms of technological surveillance monitor generally or
indiscriminately, without focusing on particular suspects. Williams & Johnson, supra note 17, at
5. The emphasis of this article, however, is on “closed systems” that target suspects individually
or by identifiable class.
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incapacitation and the preventive state helps to refract those general
concerns through the specific lens of state power when exercised
21
outside the realm of formal criminal process.
To be clear, this Article does not claim that nonphysical
restraints are necessarily, or even ever, as severe an incursion into
liberty as is full-fledged incarceration. It is difficult to imagine that
even the most assiduous constellation of technological restraints,
imposed under the same standards and for the same duration of time,
could ever effectuate a deprivation of liberty equal to that caused by
imprisonment. Rather, this Article essentially asks, if the government
can replicate the surveillance conditions of incarceration without ever
erecting a single wall, what procedures ought to govern the operation
of these virtual prisons?
I proceed as follows. Part I provides a general sketch of a range
of operable or plausible surveillance technologies that exercise
control over allegedly dangerous persons or classes of persons. This
Part claims neither to be comprehensive nor exhaustive, but rather
sets up the canvas on which the concerns identified in the rest of this
Article are drawn. Part II then maps the legal landscape surrounding
the use of these technologies. It demonstrates that these technological
restraints tend to evade serious procedural scrutiny of any kind and
instead fall far off the constitutional radar. Part III argues that the
unfettered operation of technological restraints raises grave concerns
that are all too easily obscured by the dominant referent of physical
incapacitation, the paradigmatic form of restraint. The final Part
urges a richer understanding of the interests that technological
regulations place in jeopardy and proposes the development of new
legal constructs to regulate their use.
I. TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROL
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable
22
from magic.

21. See generally Symposium, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
1 (1996) (surveying the robustness of the civil-criminal distinction both as a descriptive and
normative matter). A substantial literature also addresses punitive civil sanctions and explores
the theoretical bases for distinguishing between civil and criminal penalties. E.g., Kenneth
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1844–61 (1992).
22. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 21 n.1 (1973) (emphasis added).
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A range of new technologies has greatly enhanced the state’s
ability to monitor large numbers of individuals. With the advent of
surveillance methods less costly than physical restraint, the standard
binary of incarceration and liberty has unfurled into a broad
continuum on which those two choices mark only the extremes. This
Part introduces four loosely grouped forms of technological
surveillance and illustrates the ways in which law enforcement uses
them to monitor or control allegedly dangerous persons. Rather than
present an exhaustive catalog of restraints, or even a typology of such
mechanisms, this Part aims mainly to sketch the varied terrain on
which such methods operate. Specifically, this Part discusses DNA
databasing, electronic location monitoring, online indexing, and
biometric scanning and zoning restrictions.
A. DNA Databasing
The collection and retention of forensic DNA samples became
commonplace in the mid-1990s.23 The government routinely collects
biological material from a variety of individuals and then tests, types,
24
and uploads that information to state and national databases. Most
databases retain the typed genetic information indefinitely; currently
no state provides for deletion of an otherwise lawfully retained
sample.25 All but one state, Wisconsin, also permit indefinite retention
of the actual physical sample, which contains the individual’s entire
26
genetic code.
Initially, most mandatory DNA collection statutes applied only
27
to those convicted of sexual offenses or violent felonies. Then
legislatures started extending the mandate to include all those
convicted of any felony.28 Next came statutes that required collection
of DNA from all convicted persons, whether felons or

23. JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 11–12 (2d ed. 2005) (charting timeline of
forensic DNA development).
24. Id. at 440–41.
25. R.E. Gaensslen, Should Biological Evidence or DNA Be Retained By Forensic Science
Laboratories After Profiling? No, Except Under Narrow Legislatively-Stipulated Conditions, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 375, 376–77 (2006). Some states do require discarding of the genetic sample
or removal of the digital profile if a conviction is expunged or overturned. Id. at 377.
26. Id.
27. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 738 n.73 (2007).
28. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 438.
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29
misdemeanants. As of 2008, all fifty states, as well as the federal
government, require the submission of DNA samples from convicted
offenders according to a variety of categorical distinctions.30 The
federal government and seven states—California, Kansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia—also require samples
from arrestees,31 and other states have considered following suit.32 The
federal government has also begun collecting DNA samples from
33
detained illegal immigrants. Although no such statutes exist, it is not
difficult to imagine the passage of legislation requiring the collection
of DNA samples from mentally ill persons or other such individuals—
not on the basis of being arrested or convicted of a crime, but rather
as a result of simply being labeled “dangerous.”
As collection standards have broadened, the databases have
responded in kind. Initially, the federal government narrowly
circumscribed the range of material eligible to be “uploaded” into the
national database, providing among other things a statutory limit that
restricted the database to convicted offenders. Congress then changed
this requirement by enacting legislation to authorize the inclusion of
any sample collected according to state law.34 The federal database
now contains the genetic profiles of 3.3 million offenders, and it is
35
reportedly growing by roughly 80,000 individuals per month.
These growing databases are in turn powerful investigative tools.
Using a database, law enforcement can make associations between
known individuals and evidence collected at a scene, and among
evidence in different cases with no known suspects. Creative
innovations in DNA searching, along with rule changes initiated by

29. Id.
30. Id. (noting that some states limit collection to those convicted of specified sex offenses
or violent crimes).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-2511(e) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)(1) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105
(West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 29-3-10(A) (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon
2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2007).
32. See, e.g., H.B. 4092, 94th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007); A.B. 4108, 212th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006); H.B. 779, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); S.B. 746, Gen. Assem.,
2005 Sess. 2005 (N.C. 2005).
33. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (West 2008); Julia Preston, U.S. Set to Begin a Vast
Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at A1.
34. DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, tit. X, § 1002(1), 119 Stat. 2960
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (West 2008)).
35. Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits Policing Vs. Privacy: Data Stored on 3 Million
Americans, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1.
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the federal government, permit DNA-database searches aimed at
finding nondatabased suspects via the profiles of relatives contained
36
in the database, or even to determine a likely surname given a
37
particular genetic profile. Cases in which the suspect was identified
through a “trawl” of the database, and thus the only evidence is DNA
evidence, have increasingly percolated in the courts; most courts have
38
upheld such convictions as constitutional.
Notably, each of these provisions for mandatory collection
applies categorically. None requires any findings of particularized
need for collection—the onetime felonious bad-check writer
convicted forty years ago must provide a sample alongside the
incorrigible rapist. Moreover, most impose no limit on the retention
of either the sample or profile; both can stay in the government’s
possession even beyond the lifespan of the contributor.
Nearly every state court has endorsed DNA collection from
convicted offenders.39 Although the circuits have split on precisely
which legal rubric should be applied, with some applying the “special
40
needs” test and others using a general balancing inquiry, every
federal court to consider the issue has upheld contribution
41
requirements. Arrestee statutes, which are of recent vintage, have
yet to be aired fully as legal challenges.42 But by many accounts, the

36. Frederick H. Bieber, Charles H. Brenner & David Lazer, Finding Criminals Through
DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315–16 (2006); Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The
Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offender’s Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 250
(2006).
37. Pilar N. Ossorio, About Face: Forensic Genetic Testing for Race and Visible Traits, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 277, 278, 283 (2006).
38. See, e.g., People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (App. Div. 2000); Roberson v. Texas,
16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
39. See Ron Scherer, Should DNA Be Collected from All Criminals?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 19, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0519/p01s02usju.html# (outlining the breadth of collection in different states). But see State v. Watkins, Nos.
6805-12-04 et al., slip op. at 16–17 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 2006) (holding that the state statute
that allows DNA collection from nonviolent convicted felons violates the state constitution).
40. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658–59 (2d Cir. 2005) (summarizing such cases).
41. Id.
42. In the few instances where courts have considered these statutes, they have split on
whether to uphold them. See, e.g., In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 491–92 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding that DNA collection from arrestees violates the Minnesota and U.S.
constitutions); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (likening DNA
collection to fingerprinting and upholding a statute requiring DNA collection from persons
arrested for certain offenses); see also, e.g., State v. McKinney, 730 N.W.2d 74, 87 (Neb. 2007)
(allowing collection of a DNA sample upon a showing of probable cause that the individual
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reasoning used to uphold convicted felon statutes applies equally to
arrestees. As Judge Kozinski observed, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit
case upholding the federal collection statute:
if the reason for taking [the defendant’s] DNA while he’s on
supervised release is that it will help solve crimes later, it seems
equally justifiable to take his blood after he comes off supervised
release. . . . Which brings us to the people we really need to worry
about, namely you and me. If collecting DNA fingerprints can be
justified on the basis of the plurality’s multi-factor, gestalt high-wire
act, then it’s hard to see how we can keep the database from
43
expanding to include everybody.

Moreover, courts have routinely upheld collection of “abandoned”
44
45
DNA evidence and even surreptitious police methods of collection.
Thus, the constitutionality of arrestee statutes may have minimal
impact if law enforcement officers may compose a list of “suspicious
persons” and evade legal regulation by simply sending out mail-in
prize-claim forms or sifting through the dumpster at Taco Bell.
B. Electronic Monitoring
Technologies for electronically tracking individuals fall into two
general categories: electronic location monitors and chemical
substance monitors. These technologies are most popularly used
within the criminal justice system as a form of enhanced surveillance
during probation or parole. But attention has increasingly turned to
using these technologies outside of the formal criminal process.
Individual location monitoring programs vary greatly in the
details—including how the systems operate, what class of individuals

committed the crime for which the DNA was sought, but rejecting the use of DNA when the
DNA is not related to the probable cause).
43. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 27, at 736.
45. Several news accounts describe a variety of methods of obtaining DNA, including
taking samples of saliva after the suspect spit on the ground and sampling utensils and a glass
after the suspect ate out with his wife. Richard Willing, Police Dupe Suspects into Giving up
DNA, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at A3; Carolyn Thompson, Police DNA Collection Sparks
Questions, BOSTON.COM, Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2007/
03/17/police_get_creative_in_collecting_dna. At least one court has upheld such collection
techniques in a case in which police officers posed as attorneys seeking information and took a
sample of the saliva used by the suspect to close an envelope. State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31
(Wash. 2007).
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they cover, and how long the monitoring remains in place. Some
devices rely on transmitters that only relay whether the individual is
46
within range of a preestablished point. Active GPS systems relate
the most precise information, including the exact location of the
offender, whether through passive recordings that can later be
reviewed or through active observation of real-time activities.47
At least seventeen states have statutes in place that authorize
some form of electronic location tracking for sexual offenders on
supervised release.48 Other states have pursued implementation of
such programs through either legislative enactments or executive
orders.49 These provisions, like DNA-collection statutes, tend to be
drawn on broad categorical grounds—such as specific classes of prior
offenders—that provide for no individualized determination of
dangerousness or likely recidivism. They apply equally to the sex
offender in hospice care as to the predator on the street. Many of
these statutes apply retroactively, so that an offender convicted years
ago and long since disentangled from the criminal justice system must
suddenly resume supervision via an electronic device.50
The use of location tracking has in two respects already
expanded beyond simple regulation of sexual offenders on formal
release. First, tracking requirements no longer remain confined to
imposition during periods of formal court or parole supervision. That
is, several jurisdictions impose a lifetime monitoring requirement on
46. Cecil E. Greek, Tracking Probationers in Space and Time: The Convergence of GIS and
GPS Systems, 66 FED. PROBATION 51, 51 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Chism v. State, 824 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ind. 2005); Megan A. Janicki, Better Seen
than Heard: Residency Restrictions and Global Positioning Tracking Laws for Sex Offenders, 16
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 295–96 (2007).
48. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13902(G) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1005 et seq.
(2007); FL. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405 (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (2007); 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/5-8A-6 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2.5-3 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 692A.4A (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101(15) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 791.285 (West 2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 510.10 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-540 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(E) (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.435 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.135 (West 2007).
49. For instance, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota all apparently
engage in some form of electronic monitoring, and Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and Tennessee each have initiated pilot programs. New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota are all considering legislation.
50. Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Offenders
Away from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 964 & nn.21–22 (2006).
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designated persons, either through independent statutory mandates
or as a condition of specially concocted mandatory lifetime
51
supervision terms.
Second, the categories of persons subject to tracking
requirements include persons other than just sex offenders. San
Bernardino County, California, initiated a pilot project using GPS
tracking to monitor alleged gang members on supervised release.52
Connecticut announced a program to fit all parolees on release for
53
specified burglaries with GPS tracking devices. Another jurisdiction
is contemplating a bill to require tracking and registration of persons
never convicted but who instead were declared sex offenders
according to civil proceedings with lesser evidentiary and proof
standards than that required for criminal conviction.54 It is not
difficult to imagine a legislature writing laws applying these devices to
other purportedly high recidivist classes like drug dealers, prostitutes,
perpetrators of domestic violence, or drunk drivers.
In fact, another technology is already available to address one of
these categories—drunk drivers. In 2003, a private company first
made available the secure continuous remote alcohol monitor
(SCRAM), a bewitching device that attaches to the ankle and
purports to test the alcohol concentration levels in natural daily
55
perspiration on an hourly basis. The device date- and time-stamps
the data and stores it for transmission—typically to a probation
56
officer—via the home phone of the individual. Jurisdictions have

51. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.285 (West
2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.735 (West 2007).
52. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation Announces GPS Partnership with the City of San Bernardino to Monitor HighRisk Gang Activity (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2006_
Press_Releases/press20060314.html.
53. Associated Press, Paroled Burglars To Be Fitted with GPS Tracking Devices,
BOSTON.COM, Aug. 12, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/connecticut/articles/2007/08/12/
paroled_burglars_to_be_fitted_with_gps_tracking_devices/.
54. Blade Columbus Bureau, Plan Gains to Publicly Identify Accused: Ohio Panel Backs
Registry Proposal, TOLEDO BLADE, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20060829/NEWS24/608290360/-1/NEWS.
55. Alcohol Monitoring Systems, The SCRAM Bracelet, http://alcoholmonitoring.
com/index/scram/what-is-scram/scram-bracelet (last visited Apri. 6, 2008).
56. Id. According to one report, the device is so sensitive that offenders are instructed not
to wear cologne, rinse with mouthwash, or use any other products containing alcohol. Keeping
Watch: New Device Helping Court Monitor Those on Probation, TIMES REP. (Dover-New
Philadelphia, Ohio), Sept. 6, 2005, http://alcoholmonitoring.com/ams_files/pdf_articles/
2005/090605_timesreporter.pdf.
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adopted the devices to monitor offenders on release, especially those
57
who have incurred multiple driving under the influence convictions.
According to company promotional materials, SCRAM programs are
in place in “44 states and more than 1,500 courts and agencies, with
SCRAM monitoring more than 50,000 alcohol offenders.”58 Again,
although this technology is commonly used for offenders under
formal criminal supervision, it is easy to imagine the imposition of
lifetime monitoring requirements on habitual drunk drivers or those
prone to alcohol-related violence. Indeed, celebrity Lindsay Lohan
voluntarily wore one as a means of “demonstrat[ing] her commitment
to sobriety” after a DUI arrest.59
Unlike challenges to DNA collection and online registration acts,
challenges to requirements to wear electronic monitors do not appear
to have yet been fully litigated. As the next Part explains, however,
the Court’s reasoning with regard to sexual predator commitment
60
61
statutes and sexual offender registration acts gives some indication
that such programs would likely withstand constitutional challenge on
the grounds that they impinge on no cognizable “liberty interest” or

57. See, e.g., Tony Bizjak, Bracelet Monitors Human Drunkenness, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 23, 2006, at 2 (reporting on the use of the device and on a California Assembly bill that
urges the county to consider using bracelets); Associated Press, N.C. Courts Test AlcoholDetecting Bracelet, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 22, 2005, http://alcoholmonitoring.com/ams_files/
pdf_articles/2005/072205_winstonsalemjournal.pdf.
58. Alcohol
Monitoring
Systems,
About
Alcohol
Monitoring
Systems,
http://www.alcoholmonitoring.com/about/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). There are also
mobile drug-detection scanners that purport to reveal traces of illegal substances. See, e.g.,
Smiths Detection, http://www.smithsdetection.com/eng/narcotics_detection.php (last visited
Apr, 6, 2008) (listing devices). Such devices have become increasingly popular as a means of
screening visitors to prison facilities. See, e.g., Press Release, Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., National Study Reveals Ridge Administration Crackdown Has Made Pennsylvania
Prisons
Nearly
99
Percent
Drug
Free
(Jan.
22,
1999),
available
at
http://www.correctionsdrugtesting.com/pennstudy.htm (detailing efficacy of three ion scanners,
among other tools, in lowering rates of drug use in Pennsylvania correctional facilities);
Associated Press, Devices Linked to Decreased Drug Use in Tucson Area Prisons, ARIZ. DAILY,
Mar. 6, 2001, http://wc.arizona.edu/papers/94/113/01_92_m.html.
59. See Joshua Zumbrun, Celebs Put Their Best Foot Forward, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007,
at C1.
60. See discussion infra Part II; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001) (finding a
sexual predator commitment statute “civil” and thus upholding it against ex post facto and
double jeopardy challenges); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (upholding
commitment of a sexual predator against due process challenge). But see Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407, 409 (2002) (finding a constitutional requirement that there be some inability to control
behavior before civil commitment of sexual predator).
61. See discussion infra Part II; Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003).
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suspect class. Moreover, routine drug and alcohol monitoring,
typically done by collecting urine specimens, is familiar in the
62
criminal adjudicatory process. As of yet, there have been only
limited efforts to undertake broad, categorical testing outside the
63
strictures of the criminal justice processes —such as testing of high
64
school students and employees in sensitive positions.65 Given that
courts have largely upheld those efforts, however, it is not difficult to
imagine that courts might view a similar intrusion as lawful against a
status population like former felons, habitual drunk drivers, or
domestic abusers.
C. Electronic Indexing
A third, increasingly popular tool for regulating “dangerous”
persons is the creation and publication of indexes of such persons.
The most common type of online index is the sex offender registry,
which swept the nation in the wake of federal legislation that reduced
grant funding to states without such mandatory registration statutes.66
Every state has such an act, and in July 2006, Congress passed and
President Bush signed into law a bill authorizing the creation of a
national federal database of convicted sex offenders.67 Although the
statutes vary in specific terms, all require online publication of certain
68
sex offenders’ biographical information and charge of conviction.

62. SIMON, supra note 3, at 170–71.
63. Of course, wide latitude has long been granted such monitoring with regard to
conditional releases like probationers and parolees. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,
2196 (2006) (upholding the random, suspicionless search of a parolee).
64. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (upholding the random,
suspicionless drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665–66 (1995) (upholding the random, suspicionless testing of school
athletes); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1985) (upholding the warrantless search
of student purses).
65. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989)
(upholding drug testing of customs employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 634–35 (1989) (upholding drug testing of railway employees involved in accidents).
66. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000) (reducing federal grants to states that fail to enact
registration statutes).
67. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) (creating a national database and
also granting money for GPS tracking programs).
68. See FBI, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National/State Sex Offender Registry,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/registry.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (including links to all states’
sites, as well as the national registry); Klaaskids—Megan’s Law Legislation in All 50 States,
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Most websites publicly display a home and work address, date of
69
birth, physical characteristics, or other identifying information.
There are also websites that allow an individual to input an address,
70
which in turn generates a map of nearby listed offenders. Four states
have also passed laws requiring real estate agents to provide
information on sex offender registries to all homebuyers.71
Like DNA collection statutes, electronic monitoring
requirements tend to be triggered by broad categorical classifications
based on prior conviction without regard to present status within the
criminal justice system.72 Most statutes impose on individuals the
obligation to submit regular updates to the government—typically
every ninety days—and to actively notify the registry if they relocate,
use automobiles not registered to them, or change their appearance in
any way.73 These data collection and dissemination provisions apply
without regard to any term of supervision or formal entanglement
with criminal process, and some require registration and regular
updating for the entire lifetime of the individual.74 One Ohio
legislative panel even moved to enact a law that requires registration
of persons alleged to have propensities toward sex offenses, even if
the individual has never been convicted of a crime.75
These statutes have largely withstood legal challenges of various
kinds in state and federal courts. In 2003, the Supreme Court
http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-legmeg.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008); see also DEVON B. ADAMS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, 2001, at 1, 3 (2002),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sssor01.pdf (detailing the development of and
information available on state sex offender registries). Since issuance of this 2001 report, the
twenty-one states that did not have public online registries have launched such sites.
69. See, e.g., Delaware Sex Offender Central Registry, http://sexoffender.dsp.delaware.gov
(last visited Apr. 6, 2008); Oregon Sex Offender Inquiry System, http://sexoffenders.oregon.gov
(last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
70. See, e.g., National Sex Offender Registry, http://www.familywatchdog.us (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008). On many websites, the user can input an address and then see a map with small
flags designating the location of nearby offenders. Clicking on the flags then reveals the
offender’s photo, name, and address, as well as a hyperlink to the sex offender registry site for
the state.
71. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2079.10a (West 2008). One major real estate search engine
added sex offender registries to its online search terms. Press Release, PropertyMaps.com,
PropertyMaps.com Adds Sex Offender Registries to Real Estate Search (July 26, 2007),
available at http://www.propertymaps.com/corporate/press/media/2007_07_26_a.pdf.
72. Of course, DNA databases are in fact a form of electronic indexes of “dangerous”
persons.
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89–91, 101–02 (2003).
74. See id. at 90.
75. Blade Columbus Bureau, supra note 54.
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76

examined both the onerous Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
and the Connecticut registration act77 in light of claims that such
enactments violated the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court upheld the statutes
in both cases.78 State courts have proven equally receptive toward
such statutes,79 although some have made efforts to narrow their
80
reach.
The story of indexing, similar to that of other technological
restraints, does not stop with its deployment against sex offenders.
The New York City Council passed the Gun Offender Registration
81
Act, modeled on sex offender acts, which requires individuals
82
convicted of a gun offense to register for four years. Like the sex
offender registries on which it was modeled, the Act requires eligible
persons to submit personal information and a photograph and to
appear in person to update or confirm such information every six
months or within ten days of changing residences.83 Other
jurisdictions have expressed interest in creating registries of alleged
84
or those convicted of making or selling
gang members
methamphetamine85 or operating illegal drug laboratories.86
Online indexes are not limited just to official registries. Many
jurisdictions, no doubt in response to the proliferation of online
private companies that offer online instant background checks for an

76. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89.
77. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003).
78. See discussion infra Part II.
79. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422–23 (N.J. 1995) (rejecting numerous
constitutional challenges to New Jersey’s sex offender registry).
80. See, e.g., Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 852 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (finding the
application of a registration provision to sex offender defendants invalid under the Missouri
constitution’s prohibition on retrospective laws).
81. N.Y. CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 6, §§ 10-601 to -608 (2006).
82. Id. § 10-604.
83. Id. § 10-603.
84. Andrew Glazer, Despite Risk, L.A. Names Its Most Violent Gangs: Authorities Change
Tactics After Surge in Bloodshed Among City’s 400 Gangs, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17054161/ (reporting on the Los Angeles Police Department’s
compilation of a list of notorious gangs and the ten most wanted gang members).
85. E.g., Methamphetamine Manufacturer Registry Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-99
(2006).
86. Donna Leinwand, States List Meth Offenders on Web, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2006, at
1A.
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87
88
affordable price, have begun placing criminal records online.
Postings can include not just the judgments of conviction, but also
arrest records and dates of court proceedings.89 Legislators have also
floated proposals to place all court records and documents in an
90
openly accessible, online format, or to broadcast all court
91
proceedings on television. One particularly creative sheriff in
Arizona even hooked up a live video streaming webcam at the county
jail, so that people around the world could log on and “[w]atch what’s
happening in the Madison Street Jail NOW.”92 Although the Ninth
Circuit ultimately ruled the webcam unconstitutional (for a while it
was pointed at the toilet area of the jail), the county website retained
a “Techno-Cops” link that allowed users to search by name for
outstanding arrest warrants and had a “Crime of the Week” feature
that displayed full arrest information and mug shots upon selection of
an offense from a drop-down menu.93
Finally, the use of indexes and registries has also included
public–private partnerships in certain limited contexts. For instance,
the Transportation Security Administration has engaged in a constant
process of refining its airline security surveillance program.94 Much

87. For example, BackgroundChecks.com offers a series of background check packages,
ranging from $19.95 for either a nationwide search of sex offender registries or a single state
criminal history search to $44.95 for the “Comprehensive Background Report,” which includes
a national search for the addresses, neighbors, family members, single-state criminal history, and
real property of any person of interest. BackgroundChecks.com, https://www.
backgroundchecks.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
88. For example, one may visit the website of Washington Access to Criminal History
(WATCH) and, upon paying ten dollars, search for Washington State records of arrests less
than one year old with dispositions pending, dependency proceedings, conviction history, and
information regarding registered sex and kidnap offenders. Washington Access to Criminal
History, https://watch.wsp.wa.gov/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). Florida and Indiana are among
other states with such systems.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1153 (2002).
91. See, e.g., Jessica Brown, Live TV Comes to Mason Court, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb.
22, 2007, at 1C.
92. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004). For a critical discussion of the
implications of jail cameras, see generally Mona Lynch, Punishing Images: Jail Cam and the
Changing Penal Enterprise, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 255 (2004).
93. Maricopa Country Sheriff’s Office, http://www.mcso.org/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
94. Stephen W. Dummer, False Positives and Secure Flight Using Dataveillance When
Viewed Through the Ever Increasing Likelihood of Identity Theft, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 259,
263–66 (2006) (surveying the history of federal data mining programs in the airline industry).
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attention has popularly been paid to the compilation of “no-fly” lists
95
composed of the names of suspected terrorists.
The “Secure Flight” program, for example, relies on “data
mining and computer algorithms taken from governmental databases
of known terrorists compared against huge commercial databases
96
containing private information” to identify prospective threats.
Famously, one iteration of the no-fly system marked Senator Ted
Kennedy as a hazard and prevented him from boarding his intended
97
flights.
D. Biometric Scanning
The least developed and utilized of the four general technologies
explored here are those related to biometric techniques such as facial
recognition software or iris scanning.98 Various pilot programs have
been instituted throughout the country, although most have met with
only limited success.99 Perhaps the most famous use of facial
recognition technology occurred in 2001, when law enforcement
scanned the faces of seventy thousand people attending the Super
Bowl in Tampa yielding nineteen “hits” to faces of known terrorists,
100
none of which ultimately proved legitimate. In December 2007,

95. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1136–37 (2006) (discussing the federal government’s creation of lists
forbidding or limiting airline travel by certain individuals but without developing any procedural
safeguards to ensure the accuracy of the lists).
96. Id. at 265–66.
97. Bob Barr, Post-9/11 Electronic Surveillance Severely Undermining Freedom, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1383, 1406 (2007); Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process
Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2150 (2006).
98. Although DNA and fingerprint typing and indexing also constitute “biometric
technologies,” I separate them into another category largely to distinguish the use of technology
to identify an unknown sample from the use of technology to identify an unknown person. Thus,
for instance, a fingerprint database might allow the government either to identify the probable
source of fingerprints found at a crime scene or to identify an individual purporting to be
another person. The first use is addressed infra Part I.A, whereas this Section deals with the
latter kind of usage. Of course, the same basic technology—fingerprint identification, in this
case—is used in both instances.
99. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2007, at A1 (reporting a German study on facial recognition technique that had a 60 percent
success rate during daylight, but only a 10 percent to 20 percent rate at night).
100. Barnaby J. Feder, Technology Strains to Find Menace in the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2004, at C1. Dutch researchers recently tested the efficacy of biometric fingerprint scanners
by conducting 6400 checks of fans at European football games in an effort to identify
“blacklisted” volunteer fans. The system failed to identify 15 to 20 percent of those listed when
kept to a 0.1 percent false positive rate. Jurgen den Hartog & Ruud van Munster, How To
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however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced a one
billion dollar plan to compile a vast database of biometric
information, including digital face images, fingerprints, palm patterns,
101
iris scans, and perhaps even voice and gait recognition material.
Local reports about uses of these technologies are piecemeal and
anecdotal. According to one report, a Los Angeles Police
Department street officer used a handheld device to scan the face of a
man “illegally riding double on a bicycle,” who then came up as “94
102
percent likely to be a match” to a gang member. The individual did
turn out to be the alleged gang member and was arrested on suspicion
of violating an antiloitering gang injunction and of possessing illegal
103
drugs. Several commercial airports, including those in Boston,
Tampa, and Virginia Beach, have attempted to implement facial
scanning programs at security checkpoints, although again each
program met with only limited success.104 One Florida county installed
technology in police cars that allows officers to take a digital photo of
a suspect, scan it into a computer, and compare it to a national
database of fugitives with outstanding warrants.105 Another pilot
program used technology to scan crowds in a downtown district to
find felons and runaways, but met with no success.106
Finally, New York City announced an intention to install one
hundred cameras in downtown Manhattan and to have three
Dodge the Red Card, INFO SECURITY, Nov./Dec. 2007, http://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/features/novdec07/football.html (“Ideally, false accusation should be less than
0.01%, but not more than 0.1%. The chance of missing a hooligans [sic] on the other hand,
should be 1% or less.”).
101. Nakashima, supra note 99.
102. Associated Press, LAPD Experimenting with Facial-Recognition Software,
SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, Dec. 26, 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041226/
news_1n26lapd.html.
103. Id.
104. See Lamb, supra note 14 (reporting that a Boston airport program recognized the faces
of 153 volunteer “terrorists,” but failed to identify 96 others, and that Tampa stopped its
program after repeated failures, although Virginia Beach continued to use the system). German
researchers examining the efficacy rates of facial recognition in a crowd achieved, in a fourmonth study of a Mainz train station that saw 23,000 daily passengers and tolerated a 0.1 percent
false positive rate, roughly a 60 percent success rate during the day, which fell to 10 to 20
percent at night. Nakashima, supra note 99.
105. Facial ID Technology Makes Gains in Florida, ORGANIZED CRIME DIG., May 4, 2005,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4441/is_200505/ai_n16058151 (reporting that use of
technology has led to forty-five arrests since implementation nine months earlier).
106. Lamb, supra note 14; see also Chambers v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-000815-MR,
2006 WL 1451566, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 26, 2006) (noting that the defendant, who gave a
false name on arrest, was identified through an iris scan at the jail).
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thousand such cameras blanketing the area in an effort to increase
107
public safety. The intention is to link these cameras to license plate
readers able to “send out alerts if suspect vehicles [are] detected,”
and to install remote-controlled gates or barriers that could “block
traffic or a suspect car.”108 The police department is reportedly
contemplating using “face-recognition technology” as well109 and six
other states are purportedly compiling “enormous databases of
driver’s license photographs” to use “as a resource for law
enforcement agencies.”110
Iris scanning initiatives have also gained ground. According to
one report, a county in North Carolina implemented a database to
store the biometric images of the iris scans of sex offenders.111
Deputies also receive handheld PDA devices that allow them to scan
irises in the field that then upload remotely for comparison to the
database.112 Federal customs officials are moving toward iris scanning
and digital fingerprinting to document all those who enter the
country, and U.S. passports already encode biometric information in
an effort to integrate scanning systems.113 Finally, research is
underway to develop devices capable of long-range iris scanning,
which are perceived to have a higher accuracy rate than traditional
facial recognition programs.114
Because biometric technologies are still in development, few
legal challenges have been documented and therefore little
information exists about biometric databases or what images they
might contain. Regardless, it seems likely that biometric technologies

107. Buckley, supra note 13.
108. Id.
109. Id. One New England state in the 1990s reportedly checked cars at the turnpike
tollbooth for warrants. SIMON, supra note 3, at 199.
110. Adam Liptak, Driver’s License Emerges as Crime-Fighting Tool, but Privacy Advocates
Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A10. States have sought to introduce facial recognition
software at state motor vehicle offices to combat identity theft and the fraudulent acquisition of
state identification cards. See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, State Seeks to Get in the Face of ID Theft,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 6, 2006, at 1B.
111. Lynn Waddell & Arian Campo-Flores, Iris Scans: Keeping an Eye on Sex Offenders,
NEWSWEEK, July 24, 2006, at 8.
112. Id.
113. See Embassy Visa & Passport Services, http://www.passportsrus.com/services.php (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008) (stating that the “proposed U.S. Electronic Passport” contains an
embedded computer chip that will “securely store” a “digital photograph” to “enable biometric
comparison, through the use of facial recognition technology”).
114. Lynda Hurst, Bio-Security Still a Fantasy, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24, 2004, at A1.
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will be the method least likely to encounter any procedural
impediments. Nothing prohibits law enforcement from snapping an
115
image of an individual in public (or even via a long-range iris scan).
The Supreme Court has held that facial features, voice tone, and
other identifying public characteristics raise no Fourth Amendment
interest.116
There also appears to be no constitutional bar to assembling
those images in any particular form. In Whalen v. Roe117 the Supreme
Court found that no constitutional violation occurs simply because
the state amasses private information—there, a list of names and
addresses of all those prescribed certain prescription drugs—into a
118
computerized database. And very few restrictions limit when or
where the government may use such technologies to scan public
crowds for matches to its databases once it has amassed enough
images to make such efforts worthwhile. Supreme Court doctrine
suggests that the only likely limit on such technologies would be if
they penetrate the four walls of a private home.119
Finally, it is important to note that biometric technologies (and
the electronic location devices discussed in Section C), dovetail nicely
with the burgeoning popularity of residency and movement
restrictions that declare certain areas off limits to particular
individuals.120 Injunctions, stay-away orders,121 and “barring notices”122
are a familiar condition of release in an ongoing criminal case, parole

115. See Nakashima, supra note 99 (reporting that researchers are working on “capturing
images of people’s irises at distances of up to 15 feet, and of faces from as far away as 200
yards,” which may be “several years away”).
116. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 730–31 (1984) (finding no expectation of privacy in what is exposed to the public).
117. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
118. Id. at 605–06. The reasoning of lower court opinions upholding DNA databases
similarly underscores the likelihood of a biometric analogue being judged constitutional.
119. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a warrant for the use of a
thermal imager to determine heat radiating from inside of a home). But cf. Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 85 (1998) (upholding the warrantless peeking through a slit in the closed blinds of a
ground-level apartment).
120. See, e.g., Chiraag Bains, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional
Challenges to Residency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 483
n.5 (2007) (cataloguing sex offender statutes).
121. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 48 & n.197 (2006)
(describing a request for a stay-away order as standard protocol in domestic violence cases).
122. Id. at 22 n.66 (enumerating drug-related barring orders); Gregory A. Beck, Note, Ban
Lists: Can Public Housing Authorities Have Unwanted Visitors Arrested?, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
1223, 1234–39 (2004) (describing the operation of “no-trespass lists” or “ban lists”).

02__MURPHY.DOC

1344

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1321

or probation, but residence and zoning restrictions apply to persons
otherwise free of state supervision. States and municipalities have
imposed such restrictions as a means of controlling certain status123
124
based classes of individuals like gang members, sex offenders, or
125
the generally undesirable. When coupled with electronic tracking
devices or biometric imaging machines, however, these restrictions
serve as powerful means of monitoring and controlling certain classes
of persons.126
These mandates typically carry little to no procedural safeguards
and are applied categorically rather than individually, in contrast to
barring notices and stay-away orders. Most require that certain
classes of offenders, typically sex offenders, not live, work, or travel
within certain distances of schools, parks, or other places children
127
congregate. Legal challenges to such ordinances and statutes are
still percolating in the courts, but have thus far generally been upheld
128
against various constitutional attacks.

123. Stephanie Smith, Comment, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Due
Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1464–68 (2000) (surveying civil responses to
gang violence).
124. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 103–05 (2007). Californians approved a ballot initiative for
Proposition 83 that imposed strict residency requirements for certain categories of convicted
offenders, although a district judge then blocked its retroactive enforcement. Jennifer Warren,
Judge Blocks Part of Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at A32. Then-Attorney
General Bill Lockyer later announced that his office would interpret the law to be
nonretroactive. Bob Egelko, New Stance on Sex-Offender Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 2006, at
A1.
125. STEVE HERBERT & KATHERINE BECKETT, Zoning Out Disorder: Assessing
Contemporary Practices of Urban Social Control, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
8–11 (forthcoming 2008) (cataloguing techniques of urban control).
126. See Wendy Koch, More Sex Offenders Tracked by Satellite, USA TODAY, June 7, 2006,
at 3A (describing how “[i]f the offender enters a restricted area, such as a playground, the
receiver immediately alerts a data center, which notifies officials via cellphone, e-mail, or fax”).
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 705, 709–16 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding residency
restriction); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 775 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (same); ACLU v. City of
Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding residency restriction as
modified by district court to apply only to newly acquired residences, and not to homes
previously owned or second mortgages).
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II. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
ON THE REGULATION OF THE DANGEROUS
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court . . . . Advances in
the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that the
129
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions . . . ?

New technologies have been harnessed to control or monitor
allegedly dangerous individuals without relying on their physical
incapacitation in a wide range of ways. But of course, vast differences
exist in their actual operation and practice, both across technologies
and even within a particular technology. Consider electronic location
monitoring (such as GPS tracking). It might be ordered to monitor
pretrial a suspect in a specific criminal case, or imposed as a
sentencing condition, or required as a freestanding rule for anyone
previously convicted of a certain offense. It might be used
prospectively, for instance to alert authorities if an individual enters
into a forbidden area, or retrospectively, for example to prove that a
person was in a particular place. It might be used with prior notice to
the tracked individual or, conceivably, without alerting the individual
in advance that all movement will be monitored.
Each variation obviously evokes distinct sets of questions and
concerns. Moreover, although some of those concerns might be
common to the variety of technologies discussed above, not every one
overlaps. Not all surveillance technologies are created equal, nor
ought they all share the same permissible scope of implementation.
Indeed, this Article claims precisely that the wide variation and
nuance in the manner in which these techniques operate calls for
careful, sensitized attention to how they might be deployed in any
particular situation.
Unfortunately, the existing legal scrutiny of technological
restraints lacks the necessary degree of care and sensitivity. Across
doctrines, and with regard to a range of technologies, nonphysical
methods of incapacitation and control have been approved with

129. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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minimal, or in many cases no, judicial scrutiny of any kind. In fact,
many methods have been implemented without any meaningful effort
to analyze, much less differentiate, their appropriate scope of
application.
All of the technologies outlined in Part I apply in a broad-brush,
categorical manner, with few, if any, tailored inquiries into necessity
or possible harm. Courts have upheld most as constitutional even
when imposed retroactively or in duplicate to another form of
restraint. Few set any expiration date or temporal limit on the period
of use. For example, electronic location monitoring and sex registry
requirements all tend to be triggered by a categorical status—
typically prior conviction—apply retroactively and alongside other
forms of restraint (including one another), and remain in place for
130
decades or even life. Government databases of biometric images or
genetic material—say of purported gang members or drug dealers—
can be secretly constructed, eternally maintained, and freely searched
without any limiting restrictions on their contents.131
One possible explanation for the conspicuous absence of
meaningful judicial scrutiny may be that many technologies of
restraint first emerged within the procedural edifice of the criminal
justice system, in which established and rigorous legal standards
already governed their implementation. For instance, tracking
systems were first deployed as alternatives to otherwise authorized,
more restrictive forms of supervision—whether pre- or post-trial
physical incarceration. Thus, before the state attached a GPS bracelet
to an individual, it first had to lay charges, provide counsel, and meet
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that an individual posed a danger if
released pretrial. The alternatives, then, were equivalent: qualify for
detention and await trial either in jail or wearing a GPS bracelet.
Similarly, biometric techniques like DNA typing or iris scans
naturally inherit the legacy of their more rudimentary ancestor,
fingerprinting, which longstanding practice has allowed on a showing
of probable cause at the time of arrest.
But, as Part I illustrates, these technologies ensnare individuals
otherwise outside of any formal control of the state. GPS bracelets
have been affixed, whether by statute or executive order, on

130.
131.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.D.
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individuals who have long since finished any sentence or term of
supervision. DNA is likewise taken and stored from those in no way
subject to any special state authority or supervision. Persons long
since through with probation or parole must nonetheless report
trimonthly to an agent of the state for purposes of sex offender
registries. In these cases, then, the familiar limitations of criminal
process fall away, leaving nothing but a void.
This Part, accordingly, examines how extant constitutional
doctrines regulate the use of technological restraints against targeted
“dangerous” populations otherwise outside of the control of the
criminal justice system. Analysis reveals that such restraints evade
scrutiny in part because, across a range of claims, the notion of the
value at stake—liberty—is typically viewed through the lens of
physical incapacitation as the archetypal “paradigm of restraint.” In
short, physical deprivations serve as the touchstone of constitutional
scrutiny. But wearing an electronic bracelet, giving a DNA sample,
submitting to a facial scan, or complying with indexing requirements
only minimally impact physical liberty. Accordingly, such analysis
rarely generates cause for concern or, correspondingly, judicial
attention.
A. “Regulatory” versus “Punitive”
Physical incapacitation virtually always triggers some degree of
132
serious procedural scrutiny. The Constitution spells out a long litany
of entitlements that must be granted before a criminal “punishment”
may be imposed. Full criminal process, along with its individualized
proceedings for finding guilt, its high standard and burden of proof,
and the full range of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, must precede
all “punishment.”133 A punishment cannot be retroactive,134 cannot be
imposed in duplicate,135 and certain categories and kinds of
punishments such as those that are cruel and unusual are forbidden
136
altogether.
In contrast, “regulatory” restraints operate almost entirely
unfettered. A “civil” or “regulatory” restriction can apply

132. Even the government’s recent attempts to push the limit of this principle were met with
resistance. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
133. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII.
134. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996).
136. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979).
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retroactively and can duplicate other measures, including punitive
ones. It need not meet the strict procedural standards of criminal
process. Indeed, it may not receive constitutional scrutiny of any kind.
In sum, whereas “punitive” measures receive the protections of
constitutional criminal process, “regulatory” measures receive only
that scrutiny available to any ordinary civil enactment under the
Constitution.
What then differentiates “punitive” from “regulatory” measures?
Across a range of doctrines and over a broad span of time, the answer
has turned on the application of a multifactor test first outlined in
137
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. In the years since its articulation,
Mendoza-Martinez has emerged as the standard “in various
138
constitutional contexts,” including in assessing rights related to
substantive due process,139 procedural due process,140 self141
142
143
incrimination, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and cruel and
144
unusual punishment. Nevertheless, it remains a largely under-theradar test that garners little scholarly attention.145
Mendoza-Martinez involved a statute that automatically revoked
the citizenship of those who left the country to evade military
service.146 Finding the law “punitive” and thus violative of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the Court undertook to distinguish between
137. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
138. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). This approach has also been used to determine
cases under the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braistead, 363 U.S. 144, 160
(1960).
139. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 (1987) (finding that pretrial detention
was “regulatory” and not “punitive,” and therefore did not violate substantive due process);
Bell, 441 U.S. at 534 (rejecting prison conditions case raised by pretrial inmates on substantive
due process grounds because alleged discomfort was not punishment and did not otherwise “rise
to the level of [a] fundamental liberty interest[]”).
140. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 165–66 (holding that due process prohibited imposition
of the “punishment” of deprivation of nationality in the absence of full criminal process).
141. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (finding that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act requirement that defendants answer questions about their acts did not violate the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause because the proceeding was civil and not criminal in
nature); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249–55 (1980).
142. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362, 371 (1997).
143. Id.; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365–66 (1984).
144. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
145. Although hardly empirical proof, it is nonetheless revealing that a search in the “JLR”
database of Westlaw for “Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez” yields only 819 hits, whereas “Katz v.
United States” yields 3510, “Mathews v. Eldridge” turns up 2994, and “Terry v. Ohio” returns
3,276.
146. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963).
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147
punitive and regulatory enactments. The Court explained that it
first inquires into the legislature’s intent, noting that the legislature’s
failure to provide the procedural safeguards associated with criminal
procedure constitutes evidence that a particular measure was
intended to be civil and regulatory in nature.148
If the statute appears to be civil in nature, then only the “clearest
proof” that the effects of the regulation are punitive “will suffice to
149
Such proof is derived from an
override legislative intent.”
examination of the effects of the measure, according to the Court’s
articulation of an oft-quoted, seven-part test that asks:

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
150
relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .

This test is not applied according to any precise mathematical
formulation, however, and at various times the courts have
emphasized particular factors over others.
In operation, the Mendoza-Martinez factors have fixed the line
between regulatory and punitive measures as a function of the
151
jailhouse door. For instance, in Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court
confronted an ex post facto claim regarding a sex offender
registration statute’s retroactive application. Applying the MendozaMartinez test, the Supreme Court looked to the “affirmative disability
or restraint” factor and observed that the “Act imposes no physical
restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment,

147. Id. at 165–66.
148. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003) (“The Act itself does not require the procedures
adopted to contain any safeguards associated with the criminal process. That leads us to infer
that the legislature envisioned the Act’s implementation to be civil and administrative.”). Even
the inclusion of such safeguards, however, does not necessarily render it punitive. Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371–72 (1986).
149. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
150. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted).
151. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
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152
which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint.” The
Court even dismissed the import of the physical restrictions that the
statute did impose—such as the “requirement of periodic updates”153
or the fact that “registrants must inform the authorities after they
change their facial features (such as growing a beard), borrow a car,
or seek psychiatric treatment”154—and noted that “minor and
155
indirect” restraints are “unlikely to be punitive.”
The D.C. Circuit likewise relied upon the “paradigm” of
156
incarceration in Johnson v. Quander, which upheld the retroactive
application of a DNA collection statute against an ex post facto claim.
Asking whether DNA collection imposed an “affirmative disability,”
the court concluded that the “DNA Act ‘imposes no physical
restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of
imprisonment.’”157 As a result, the measure was not punitive. Similar
reasoning could easily apply to statutes mandating electronic location
tracking or collecting biometric images for use in databases. Image
collection entails no physical restraint of any kind, and electronic
location tracking at best involves only a minor physical inconvenience
in the form of a bracelet or other device.
Courts have also applied the remaining Mendoza-Martinez
factors by referencing the physical world while simultaneously
dismissing its virtual counterpart. For example, in Smith v. Doe, a
lower court had applied the “history and tradition” of punishment
factor and concluded that an online index was “of fairly recent origin”
158
and thus could not qualify as “punishment.” On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the litigants countered that the online index
159
resembled the shaming and banishments punishments of yore.
Rebuking the analogy, the Court observed that historical
punishments “staged a direct confrontation between the offender and
the public” and “either held the person up before his fellow citizens

152. Id. at 99–100 (emphasis added); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104
(1997) (finding that bar from working in banking industry is “certainly nothing approaching the
‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment”).
153. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
157. Id. at 502 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100).
158. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
159. Id.
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160
for face-to-face shaming or expelled him from the community.” The
registries, in contrast, merely disseminated information with a
purpose to “inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the
161
offender.” Because the confrontation took place in virtual rather
than physical space and the purpose was framed as informational
rather than experiential, the Court concluded that the measure was
162
not punitive.
In sum, technological restraints—which impose harm in
predominantly nonphysical forms—are rarely found to constitute
punitive restraints. Of course, the mere designation of a measure as
regulatory need not necessarily foreclose a finding that additional
procedural protections are nonetheless warranted. But whereas the
punitive label brings with it the constellation of constitutional
163
criminal entitlements, the regulatory classification carries no clear
next procedural step. Typically, a measure judged “civil” under
Mendoza-Martinez only triggers procedural scrutiny if it also
implicates a “liberty interest” founded in state law or the
164
Constitution.

B. Due Process and “Liberty Interests”
The rubric of procedural due process arguably constitutes the
most natural vehicle for a procedure-based challenge to a
technological restraint. But when it comes to these regulatory
restraints, it is unclear what constitutional standard should apply.
Courts typically ask first whether a measure is in fact punitive,
applying the Mendoza-Martinez test outlined in Section A.165 If
punitive, then the necessary procedural requirements are those
dictated by the strict constitutional requirements for criminal process.

160. Id. at 98.
161. Id. at 99.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 880 (Pa. 2007) (“The number of
arguments raised by Appellees tends to obscure that Appellees succeed only if we accept the
premise, which we have all but categorically rejected in our prior cases, that the registration,
notification, and counseling provisions of Megan’s Law II are punitive in the constitutional
sense, thus requiring observance of all the due process protections that attend criminal
prosecution, especially those identified by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Apprendi.”).
164. See infra Part II.B.
165. See supra Part II.A.
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If characterized as regulatory, however, the inquiry becomes
clouded. Courts tend to resort to the conventional test of procedural
due process, which first asks whether the measure infringes a
166
cognizable “liberty interest.” But as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated, such “liberty interests” must materialize either in
positive state law or as the fundamental rights enshrined in the
167
Constitution.
Yet here again, as in the punitive–regulatory
distinction, such “liberty interests” tend to begin only at the jailhouse
door.
No one doubts that the government infringes liberty when it
physically incarcerates individuals. Freedom from “physical detention
by one’s own government” has been described as “the most elemental
of liberty interests.”168 Even in a criminal case, a due process right to
counsel has been “recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose
169
his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” To be sure, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that “‘liberty’ . . . is not confined to
mere freedom from bodily restraint,”170 but at the same time, it has

166. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see also Doe v. Miller, 405
F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005).
167. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. See generally Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due
Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 44–45 & nn.242–44 (describing the Court’s approach to liberty and
summarizing popular critiques).
168. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). In Foucha the Court held that “[f]reedom from bodily
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The Supreme Court in McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24 (2002), addressed a prison rehabilitation program that required inmates to confess
to prior crimes without a promise of immunity, or else have their housing transferred to a far
more restrictive block. Id. at 30–31. Noting that a refusal to participate “did not extend [the
defendant’s] term of incarceration,” or “affect his eligibility for good-time credits or parole,” the
Court found no due process liberty interest—or even a lesser interest relevant for a Fifth
Amendment compulsion analysis—in remaining in medium, rather than maximum, security. Id.
at 38–39. This simply underscores the degree to which the Court views the deprivation
determination as zero-sum; the relevant inquiry is whether the state has taken physical liberty or
not, not to what degree such deprivation is effectuated.
169. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). The Court has held that such
loss of liberty includes the possible loss of liberty should a suspended sentence be executed.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 675 (2002).
170. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Indeed, the Court has held:
[liberty is] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
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failed to define the notion of “liberty” with “any great precision.”
Generally speaking, the “liberty interests” defined by deprivations of
privacy172 or impediments to work,173 housing,174 or bodily autonomy175
stand on far shakier footing than the right to be free of corporeal
176
restraint. Accordingly, technological regulations, which again rarely

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291 (1999) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“The Due Process Clause
guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of
physical restraint.”).
171. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
172. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court observed that “[w]hile there is no ‘right
to privacy’ found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has recognized that
‘zones of privacy’ may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose
limits upon government power,” id. at 712–13. It also noted, however, that “‘right of privacy’
cases, while defying categorical description, deal generally with substantive aspects of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 713; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992) (“[M]atters[] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court rejected the defendant’s claim, which
was based on the sheriff’s public posting of the defendant’s name and picture on an “Active
Shoplifters” flyer, noting that “[t]he activities detailed as being within this definition were ones
very different from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection-matters relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”
Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.
173. For instance, the Court has held that a state may clearly enact a general scheme of
legislation that inhibits individuals’ economic liberties by foreclosing their ability to pursue a
lawful occupation. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106–08 (1978)
(upholding a California statute regulating the grant of franchises in the auto industry and
comparing cases); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding an
Oklahoma law prohibiting the fitting or duplication of eyeglasses without a written prescription
from an ophthalmologist). Rejecting the notion that a search of an attorney’s office infringed
upon the right to freely exercise of a profession, the Court stated that although there might exist
a liberty interest in “choos[ing] one’s field of private employment,” such a right “is nevertheless
subject to reasonable government regulation.” Conn, 526 U.S. at 292.
174. Courts have rejected a constitutional right to housing in a variety of contexts. See, e.g.,
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73–74 (1972) (rejecting the claim that the “‘need for decent
shelter’ and the ‘right to retain peaceful possession of one’s home’ are fundamental interests”
because there is no “constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or
any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy” property outside of a contractual situation);
Royer ex rel. Estate of Royer v. City of Oak Grove, 374 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
“no property interest in having unlimited access to a public building”).
175. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (assuming liberty interest in “matters of
personal appearance” but finding no infringement in law that dictated permissible hair lengths
for local police officers). But see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (finding a
“significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” but finding it commensurate
with the right as established in positive state law).
176. But see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982). Youngberg addressed a due
process claim by an institutionalized, mentally retarded person that his conditions of
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impinge physical freedom in any meaningful way, can thus easily
escape constitutional attention.
For example, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
177
Doe, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural due process
challenge to the Connecticut law creating a state sex offender
178
registry. The law required every eligible offender to provide the
state with personal information including a name, current address of
residence, photograph, and DNA sample.179 Offenders then had to
verify the accuracy of this information every ninety days (or notify
the agency upon change) for a period of ten years or, for certain
offenders, life.180 The act applied without any individual
determination of dangerousness and its scope included nonviolent
181
offenders. There was no allowance for any tailored formal or
informal process or an individualized showing of danger. The state
published this information on a public website that could be searched
by zip code or town name.182
Eight of nine Justices, in addressing a procedural due process
claim, agreed that these reporting requirements likely invoked no
183
cognizable liberty interest of any kind. Of course, the statute
contained at least one express, recurring deprivation of the
defendant’s physical liberty: defendants had to check in at a
government office every ninety days for the rest of their lives. Yet
because the reporting obligation was framed in informational terms, it
did not register with the Court as an infringement deserving of any
scrutiny or procedural oversight.184 Equally as importantly, the Court

confinement were both unsafe and unnecessarily restrictive. Finding liberty interests in both
concerns, the Court found a duty to provide the claimant with “reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions,” among other things. Id. at 324.
177. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
178. Id. at 4–6.
179. Id. at 4–5.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 7.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id. at 6–7.
184. Of course, it still might have found that no process was necessary to prevent its
erroneous deprivation. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining a three-part
inquiry triggered by a liberty interest that weighs the private interest affected, the risk of
erroneous deprivation using the procedures in place, and the value of any additional
procedures).
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expressly rejected an interest in not having to report every change of
185
hair color or address to the government.
Indeed, the closest the Connecticut Department of Public Safety
Court could come to recognizing an interest implicated by the
mandatory registration and dissemination regime was a nod to a
foggy, trivial interest in “reputation” that was deemed
186
noncognizable. Even Justice Stevens, the sole member of the Court
to acknowledge an impinged liberty interest, could define that
interest only in conclusory terms, stating summarily in the companion
case, Smith v. Doe, that “these statutes unquestionably affect a
constitutionally protected interest in liberty.”187
Procedural due process challenges to DNA collection statutes
have likewise faltered on the ground that the interest intruded upon
does not rise to a constitutionally cognizable level. As the Ninth
Circuit succinctly held, “[t]he extraction of blood from an individual
in a simple, medically acceptable manner, despite the individual’s lack
of an opportunity to object to the procedure, does not implicate the
Due Process Clause.”188 Framed this way, no general interest in
“genetic privacy” could apparently generate the requisite “liberty”
interest. From this reasoning the government arguably need not
infringe on a cognizable liberty interest when it captures and stores a
biometric image of an individual in a database
Even affixing a location-tracking device could quite readily be
viewed as no meaningful deprivation of liberty under the current
conception of the term. Such devices impose only the slightest

185. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7–8.
186. Id. at 6. Regardless, the Court held that, to the extent that a cognizable interest existed,
the offenders’ requests for individualized determinations of dangerousness were not warranted
because the statutory regime drew no distinctions nor worked any deprivations on that basis. Id.
at 7–8. Justices Souter and Ginsburg wrote separately to note that the Court’s holding did not
foreclose a substantive due process claim, and also to underscore that the statute’s provisions
allowing exemptions for certain sex offenders might raise equal protection problems. Id. at 9
(Souter, J., concurring).
187. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 112 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562–63 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d
1337, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a procedural due process challenge to a DNA-collection
statute due to the lack of a cognizable liberty interest); Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79,
92–93 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting the decreased expectation of privacy for convicts on probation, the
compelling state interest of identification, and the limited uses for the DNA samples). A Kansas
federal district court reached the same conclusion, adding that “even if [the] challenge is to the
enactment of the law, rather than the method of the blood draw, his argument fails. When
legislation affects a general class, the legislative process satisfies due process requirements.”
Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1169–70 (D. Kan. 2003).
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physical discomfort and will become even less intrusive over time. To
the extent that they impose any physical harm, it is at best “minor and
189
indirect,” and thus “unlikely to be punitive.” The Supreme Court
has, in fact, found no property interest affected by the affixing of a
tracking device on personal property, because even the “technical
trespass” did not interfere with the defendant’s interest in “a
190
meaningful way.” Moreover, tracking devices do not impede
individuals from moving freely in society, but simply watch them as
they do; so long as such watching is outside of the home,191 then no
constitutional concerns are raised.
The Court employed this very line of reasoning in the sex
registry cases: whereas “liberty” might be infringed if the state
refused to allow an individual to borrow a car or cut one’s beard, no
liberty interest at all is affected so long as the government requires
192
merely that the individual report having done so. Given this
proclivity toward conceiving “liberty interests” as founded
predominantly in physical terms, rather than in privacy or autonomy,
it is hard to imagine that location monitoring—much less DNA
typing, biometric imaging, or online indexing—would infringe any
recognized interest.
To the extent that no cognizable “liberty interest” is likely to be
found for purposes of procedural due process, it remains even less
likely that an interest will be recognized under substantive due
process—an even more parsimoniously applied doctrine.193 In
contrast, a state would be hard-pressed to physically restrain an
individual without infringing a constitutionally recognized right

189. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
190. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (finding, inter alia, that the surreptitious
installation of an electronic tracking device in a drum sold to the defendant did not interfere
with any cognizable “possessory interest”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983).
191. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718 (requiring a warrant only for police monitoring of a beeper inside
a home); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding the warrantless use of a
thermal imager to detect heat emanating from inside a home to be an unlawful search).
192. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101; see also id. at 100 (stating that “[t]he Act does not restrain
activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences,” and
noting only that while they “must inform the authorities after they change their facial features
(such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek psychiatric treatment, they are not required to
seek permission to do so”).
193. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended.”).
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194
worthy of substantive due process scrutiny. Indeed, from the series
of cases involving civil physical incapacitation, it is evident that
procedural safeguards play a critical role in determining the
constitutionality of the incapacitation regime.
195
which upheld
For example, in United States v. Salerno,
“regulatory” pretrial detention of certain criminal suspects, the Court
specifically cited the elaborate procedural safeguards of the Bail
Reform Act and remarked that a “scattershot attempt to incapacitate
196
those who are merely suspected . . . of crime[]” would not have
stood. Similarly, in the sexual predator cases, the Court has
specifically required that such statutes entail “proper procedures or
evidentiary standards,” for instance, “a finding of dangerousness
either to one’s self or to others,” and a “plus” factor such as mental
illness or disease.197 The Court has even specifically found
unconstitutional the commitment of sexual offenders “without any
198
lack-of-control determination.” In cases of regulatory physical
incapacitation, then, the degree of process appears mainly to either
bolster the regime against substantive due process attack, or else
serve as a basis for wholesale invalidating it.
But the courts have been far less demanding in dealing with
“regulatory” measures. In addressing sex offender registries, courts
have shied away from finding a cognizable interest of any kind, noting
that “the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of
199
substantive due process.” In fact, even those few courts that have
invalidated provisions of such acts using a substantive due process
rationale have done so applying rational basis review rather than any
heightened type of scrutiny.200

194. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979) (noting that concerns about the
incarceration conditions of pretrial detainees are properly addressed as due process matters).
195. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
196. Id. Moreover, the Court observed, the category of those even deemed eligible for
detention was limited to individuals charged with serious offenses, and detention was permitted
only for the limited, pretrial period. Id.
197. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) (rejecting substantive due process, ex
post facto, and double jeopardy challenges); see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 254 (2001)
(noting a “panoply of protections,” including the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
198. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (invalidating a provision, apparently on
substantive due process grounds).
199. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 842–43 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
200. ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1226 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (invalidating
a registration provision for offenders convicted of crimes lacking a specific sexual component);
State v. Small, 833 N.E.2d 774, 782–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating a registration
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Regulatory measures that do not deprive physical liberty,
however, seem capable of being crafted in the crudest procedural
201
terms yet nonetheless survive constitutional scrutiny. The Smith v.
Doe Court ratified this stance, differentiating the ex post facto
challenge to the physical confinement of sexual predators as requiring
“individual assessment” due to the “magnitude of the restraint,”
whereas such an assessment was unnecessary as regards to online
indexing because the “[a]ct . . . imposes the more minor condition of
registration.”202
C. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”
The Fourth Amendment provides another possible candidate for
constitutional scrutiny of technological restraints on liberty.
Interestingly, although Fourth Amendment litigation has dominated
some of the new technologies, challenges regarding others have
203
largely overlooked or ignored such claims. Thus, early litigation
about the constitutionality of DNA collection statutes focused largely
upon search and seizure arguments, whereas sex offender registration
acts tended to be framed as equal protection or due process problems
rather than as repeated, suspicionless, and intrusive seizures or
searches for information in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
It is well established that to trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny,
a police practice must constitute an intrusion on “an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
204
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Here again, however, the courts have
tended to define such expectations with reference to the physical
world, notwithstanding the promise long ago that the amendment

provision as violating substantive due process when it did not specify that conviction be based
on sexual acts).
201. One aspect of the Mendoza-Martinez test—whether the restraint is “excessive” in
relation to its purpose—can singularly transform a measure from regulatory to punitive.
Probably because of this potency, however, it is rarely invoked. But see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.
84, 116–17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding Alaskan registration act “excessive[] in
relation to its nonpunitive purpose” because it “applies to all convicted sex offenders, without
regard to their future dangerousness” and carries “exorbitant” duration and reporting
requirements without any reference to the possibility of rehabilitation).
202. Id. at 104 (majority opinion).
203. The Court has held, however, that if a specific constitutional provision governs the
government action in question, then that provision should guide the relevant constitutional
inquiry as opposed to more nebulous provisions such as the Due Process Clause. County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998).
204. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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205
would protect “people, not places.” Thus, the home remains a
206
citadel or the slightest movement of a stereo creates a constitutional
moment,207 even though the garbage on the street, the dialed numbers
on a phone or the records at the bank receive no constitutional
208
protection at all. The test relies upon the public–private distinction
as drawn by the physical world; “the police can infringe privacy in
209
ways that anyone else might infringe it,” even if no one else is likely
to do so.
Technologies of restraint, however, tend to operate in a manner
that entails minimal formal physical intrusion into the private sphere.
A DNA sample can be collected, typed, and placed in a database by
simply swabbing a cheek or even picking up a discarded straw. A GPS
bracelet generally reveals no more information than would an alert,
round-the-clock surveillance team. Biometric images can be collected
without even informing the target, as can public scanning equipment
be deployed without any physical interference with movement or
traffic. And apart from a reporting burden placed on those required
to comply with indexes, the information collected is often that which
can be readily obtained from third-party or public sources. In sum,
because the privacy interests most gravely affected by technologies of
restraint do not take the form of physical intrusions on sacred spaces
or bodily integrity, courts are apt to disregard them as viable interests
at all.
For example, in United States v. Kincade,210 the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the compulsory DNA testing requirement for certain
211
federal offenders. Applying a totality of the circumstances balancing
test, the court began by assessing the burden the statute placed on the
offenders.212 The primary approach looked to the physical intrusion
that a blood test imposes and concluded that the intrusion was
213
minimal. The court easily concluded that blood tests are in fact

205. Id. at 351.
206. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
207. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987).
208. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744
(1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
209. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1269 (1999).
210. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
211. Id. at 816.
212. Id. at 836.
213. Id.
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“routine” and certainly far less intrusive than the body cavity searches
and other physical indignities to which federal offenders are routinely
214
subjected. Concerns of a less corporeal variety, such as those
regarding privacy and misuse of information, were readily
215
disregarded. Because the typed genetic profile constituted only “a
record of the defendant’s identity,”216 the retention of both that
information and, more problematically, the entire biological sample,
217
was deemed inconsequential.
The Second Circuit’s analysis of the impact of the New York
DNA database law was similarly dismissive of noncorporeal
218
interests. The inquiry began with the physical intrusion, which the
219
court easily immediately discarded as de minimis. To its credit, the
court then did expressly acknowledge a second, “potentially . . . far
greater intrusion than the initial extraction of DNA,”220 namely the
analysis and indefinite maintenance of the profile in a database. But
the court observed that the statute “provides only for the analysis of
identifying markers,”221 ignoring that the statutes also sanctioned
government retention of the entire DNA sample for no apparent
purpose. The closest the court came to acknowledging less corporeal
concerns, such as the significance of the unrestricted police possession
222
of an individual’s entire genomic code, was to observe that evidence
of abuse of samples was “not present here”223 and that a range of

214. Id. at 836–37.
215. Id. at 837–38.
216. Id. at 837.
217. Id. at 837–38.
218. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We therefore conclude that
New York’s statute, which serves a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, is
supported by strong government interests that outweigh the relatively minimal intrusion on
plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy.”).
219. Id. at 669.
220. Id. at 670.
221. Id.
222. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(5) (McKinney 2007) (“The sample shall be collected,
stored and forwarded to any forensic DNA laboratory which has been authorized by the
commission to perform forensic DNA testing and analysis for inclusion in the state DNA
identification index.”). There is no persuasive argument for retaining samples. Once a sample is
typed and entered into the database, it is thenceforth associated with the individual and their
identifying information. In the event that the sample should later be shown to match a crime
scene, the individual would be arrested and typed again for confirmatory purposes. Thus,
retention of the physical specimen—and the wealth of intimate information it contains—is
unjustified.
223. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670.
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statutes prohibited the intentional disclosure or misuse of “DNA
224
records” (although notably, not samples).
Similarly, although challenges to devices tracking humans have
yet to fully be aired, there are some indications of how the Supreme
Court has viewed the privacy expectations involved in tracking
225
226
generally. In United States v. Karo and United States v. Knotts, the
Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment was not
implicated by the surreptitious planting of electronic tracking devices
on moving vehicles to ascertain publicly available knowledge such as
the movement of a vehicle on a public street.227 This reasoning stood
even when the obtained information necessarily relied upon the
tracking device’s technology—because, for instance, officers had lost
sight of the car—so long as the car itself remained in public space.228
By analogy, it would be easy to argue that the physical intrusion of a
monitoring bracelet invades no cognizable expectation of privacy, at
least as regards any information other than what individuals are doing
within their own homes. Indeed, it is not a stretch to conceive that
even the relatively painless implantation of a chip the size of a grain
of rice is more akin to a routine DNA blood extraction than an
intrusive surgery229 and likewise permit it without finding any privacy
interest infringed.
Finally, an easy case can be made that the capture and storage of
facial or other biometric images of an individual similarly
compromises no cognizable interest, and therefore does not invoke
Fourth Amendment scrutiny at all. That which is “knowingly
230
expose[d] to the public,” like a face or even an iris, receives no
Fourth Amendment protection. Indeed, given the degree to which
DNA is shed or “abandoned” daily,231 an individual’s entire genetic

224. Id. (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 995-d(1) to -f) (emphasis added).
225. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
226. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
227. Karo, 468 U.S. at 711–13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–85.
228. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
229. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
230. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
231. For instance, in a high-profile Durham, North Carolina, murder case, the prosecution
presented evidence of the defendant’s DNA on a Diet Coke can found at the crime scene. John
Springer, Witness Juggling Puts Trial on Hold, COURT TV NEWS, July 30, 2003,
http://www.courttv.com/trials/novelist/073003_ctv.html; see also David H. Kaye, Science Fiction
and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006), http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/7 (“Shed DNA is a real issue.”).
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code is routinely on public display, and courts have held
232
accordingly.
D. Equal Protection
Lastly, it bears mention that the Equal Protection Clause might
also be a vehicle for regulating technological restraints on liberty. For
instance, Justice Souter, writing separately in Connecticut Department
of Public Safety and joined by Justice Ginsburg, observed that the
registration act’s provisions allowing exemptions for certain sex
offenders but not others might raise equal protection problems.233 Yet
numerous obstacles preclude wholesale reliance on equal protection
claims.
First, equal protection jurisprudence applies searching scrutiny
only to government actions that impinge upon either “fundamental
rights” or certain “suspect or semi-suspect” classes like race or
234
gender. Most technological restraints, however, are not expressly
imposed along those suspect categorical lines, but rather tie to a
status such as prior conviction or allegedly dangerous proclivities.
Accordingly, such techniques may likely receive only rational basis
review, which tends to grant great deference to government
authority.235
Second, to the extent that the imposition of technologies of
restraint does receive closer scrutiny, even under rational basis
review, the tools of the Equal Protection Clause have been used to
cut more crudely than constructively. Equal protection review tends
to be zero-sum, carving out statutory provisions or eliminating a
statutory provision altogether. Courts that have invalidated portions
of sex offender regulations under rational basis review have
effectively excised whole categories of offenders—for instance, by

232. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment & Genetic
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 865–66 & nn.43–45 (2006). For an argument that First
Amendment values ought to shape and inform Fourth Amendment inquiries, see Daniel J.
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112, 151–54 (2007).
233. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
234. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 962–63 (2002).
235. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 844–45 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). But see People v. Kail,
501 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding the prosecution of a prostitute under an
obscure ordinance requiring bells on bicycles to violate the Equal Protection Clause, even under
rational basis review); ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1225–26 (N.M. Ct. App.
2006) (finding sex offender registration not to implicate “fundamental rights” but nonetheless
invalidating some of the law’s provisions under rational basis review).
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excluding individuals required to register because they have prior
kidnapping convictions when the conviction contains no sexual
236
Equal protection alone, as generally
coercion component.
conceived, is an inadequate tool for conducting a more sensitive
inquiry, which might find a particular restraint appropriate with the
addition of some procedural safeguards or limits on the scope of
application (for example, in terms of duration or retroactivity).
E. Summary
In sum, noncorporeal restraints on liberty are currently
implemented without any meaningful scrutiny because courts apply
an unduly rigid notion of what justifies legitimate procedural and
constitutional concern. They fall outside the conventional boundaries
of constitutional criminal process because they are not considered
“punishment.” They evade scrutiny under either procedural or
substantive due process because they do not affect a cognizable
“fundamental right” or “liberty interest.” They are not captured by
the Fourth Amendment because, despite the promise that the
Amendment is about “people, not places,” the physical realm still
largely governs the standards for “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
And they receive the most deferential scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because they do not impinge a fundamental right
or regulate a suspect class. In short, as “regulatory” measures not
affecting physical liberty, these techniques avoid meaningful scrutiny
aimed at delimiting their permissible application.
The why of this condition is of less concern than the fact that it
exists. That is, it matters not whether the attachment to the physical
paradigm stems from a vestigial familiarity with the physical world as
the framework through which human beings experience virtual space
and identity or whether it derives from a deliberate evaluation of
physical restraints as meaningfully different in kind from
237
noncorporeal ones. It is interesting to observe, by comparison, that

236. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that certain
crimes also require a nexus to the sexual offense); ACLU, 137 P.3d at 1226 (invalidating
registration based on kidnapping and false imprisonment convictions); State v. Small, 833
N.E.2d 774, 782–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating a provision as applied to a defendant
convicted of kidnapping if no sexual motivation were shown).
237. Indeed, as technology continues to bestow a range of options for engaging virtually in
the world, questions of space and identity become increasingly complex. A virtual self may have
as much dimension and depth as an actual one—perhaps even more. Yet at the same time, no
matter how robustly realized the virtual person may be, it is hard to deny the persistent truth of
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the Court has hesitated less in recognizing the significance of
nonphysical deprivations of property rights; the constitutional
protections of the takings clause, for instance, protect both physical
238
and regulatory takings. But whatever the reason for the reluctance
to scrutinize regulatory deprivations of liberty, what matters for the
purposes of this Article is that, as Part III explains, such techniques
can and do effectuate significant harms that merit closer examination.
III. FOUR PHYSICS OF THE NONPHYSICAL WORLD
These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend
whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away
by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may
be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to
emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which
239
government may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will.

Across doctrines, judicial supervision of state-imposed restraints
on liberty consists primarily, if not exclusively, of appraisals measured
in physical terms. An insignificant deprivation of physical liberty
triggers constitutional scrutiny, even though extremely burdensome
noncorporeal restraints receive little to no scrutiny at all. But
phrasing inquiries into the impact of new technologies in outmoded
concepts of physical liberty wrongly frames the question. The nature
of the burden placed on the individual by the state cannot be
captured simply by determining how painful is the blood sampling,
how cumbersome is the GPS bracelet, or whether one can feel a face

the physical being. I am reminded of the scene in David Henry Hwang’s reinterpretation of
Madame Butterfly, in which the civil servant Gallimard—having learned that the opera diva with
whom he has fallen in love is in fact a man, and not a woman—commits suicide because he
cannot overcome the physical sexual identity of his lover, notwithstanding her pleas that “[i]t’s
the same skin you’ve worshipped for years. Touch it.” DAVID HENRY HWANG, M. BUTTERFLY
act 3, sc. 2.
238. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (setting forth
a balancing test for determining what constitutes a regulatory taking). In struggling to define
what constitutes a taking, however, the Court has similarly privileged physical deprivations. Id.
at 125 (“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.”). I thank Professor Ron Wright for suggesting this analogy.
239. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 329, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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scan. Many people would likely agree that a lifetime of electronic
monitoring impinges liberty far more severely than one night in jail.
This Part argues that physical deprivation is not the most, and
certainly not the only, pertinent referent for understanding the impact
and effect of technological restraints. In fact, reliance upon a physical
paradigm actively obscures four concerns raised by the use of
technological restraints: the ease with which they proliferate, the
manner in which they can cumulate, the degree to which they operate
without accountability, and the extent to which the harms they
impose are invisible. First, whereas technological restraints
superficially appear as simply less invasive alternatives to physical
restraints, in reality they enhance and increase state power rather
than substitute for the exercise of physical control. Second, whereas
physical restraints visibly constrain the body, technological restraints
cumulate less visibly, exacerbating the threat to liberty in a manner
evident only when considered in aggregate. Third, whereas the power
of physical restraint rests exclusively in the state, and therefore the
state can be held directly accountable for its consequences,
technological restraints are wielded by potentially unruly and less
readily accountable third parties. Lastly, whereas the harm of physical
restraint is manifest and acute, the harms of technological restraints
are often contingent and protracted, and therefore are both less
visible and less manageable. What follows is an examination of each
of these issues in turn.
A. Proliferation
Technological restraints on liberty characteristically present as
substitutes for their physical world counterparts. A typical assessment
is that technological advances simply hone otherwise ordinary
physical mechanisms and thereby render them more efficient, more
accurate, and less intrusive. In this view, the electronic bracelet is the
less restrictive alternative to the jail cell or on-site surveillance, the
DNA sample or biometric scan a more accurate alternative to the
fingerprint or eyewitness, and the online record the more efficient
alternative to its paper and file counterpart. Rather than question
every fan at the ballpark, officers can sit unobtrusively on the
sidelines with their facial scanner or DNA swab. Rather than go
downtown to retrieve cumbersome paper documents, an officer can
just scan an image remotely or a suspicious neighbor can simply run a
web search online.
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But technologies of restraint do not simply provide more
efficient means to the same end. Technology alters—rather than just
mechanizes—the relationship between the individual and the state.
By way of illustration, consider a recent study of toll rate changes on
the interstate highway system. The researcher found that toll rates
increased 20–40 percent on thoroughfares that have adopted
electronic toll collection systems, like FasTrak or E-ZPass, when
compared to those that still relied on manual collection.240 She offered
the simple explanation that hidden costs are easily hiked costs—
automating the activity of toll collection rendered it not just quicker
and more efficient, but in fact changed the nature and salience of the
tax imposed.241 Anecdotal observations provide additional support for
the idea that technology changes, rather than simply optimizes, such
relationships. In San Francisco, FasTrak users have specially
designated lanes that allow them to pass through timed traffic lights
(aimed at regulating signals) at a more rapid pace.242 In central
Florida, new highway construction presumes that drivers have Sun
Pass systems and relies upon sensors on a bar over the highway to
collect tolls; to pass through an actual toll booth to pay with cash,
drivers must exit into lanes alongside the regular travel lanes (akin to
rest stops).243 Technology, then, does more than just make traveling
with FasTrak more efficient—it also makes traveling without it more
cumbersome. By comparison, a no-fly database and iris scanning
device may mean that some innocent persons will never be intrusively
searched at the airport again, but it also may mean that other
innocent persons will always be subjected to such searches.

240. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12924, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/~afinkels/
papers/EZTax_Finkelstein_February_07.pdf; see also David Leonhardt, Technology Eases the
Ride to Higher Tolls, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at C1 (“A decade after one [tollbooth] gets
electronic tolls, it will be about 30 percent more expensive on average than a similar tollbooth
without it. There [is] no shortage of examples: the Golden Gate Bridge, the George Washington
Bridge and the Tappan Zee Bridge, among them.”).
241. Finkelstein, supra note 240, at 34–35.
242. See Michael Cabanatuan, FasTrak Bridge Traffic Speedier, Thanks to Faster Metering
Lights, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2007, at B2 (noting that the highway authority gave “FasTrak users
a 10-to-15 percent shorter wait, while delaying cash-payers by a similar amount” and citing a
study by the toll authority that FasTrak users on certain highways move faster than cash
payers).
243. Associated Press, SunPass Drivers Will Whiz by New Florida Turnpike Booths, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.sptimes.com/2007/01/22/State/SunPass_
|drivers_will_.shtml.
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These dynamics of highway travel may very well provide insights
into the dynamics of noncorporeal incapacitation of dangerous
persons. The constraints of the physical world serve as a major curb
on the power of the punitive state. A police department faces a wide
range of enforcement options and cannot pursue them all; it must task
its officers to those assignments perceived most critical. The same
limitations confront the correctional system; already the jails and
prisons are bursting at the seams.244 Most ordinary citizens do not
worry about the police tailing them or sifting through their curbside
trash or peering in their windows—not because the law prevents the
police from engaging in such activity, but because simple economics
prohibit it from occurring on a wide scale. Resource constraints
impose priorities on the exercise of the police power, which in turn
curbs excess and abuse.245 The same constraints restrain private acts of
vigilance: many people may have an interest in the criminal histories
of all their neighbors, but absent some certain benefit in making the
task a priority, they simply will not expend the time and energy
necessary to figure it out.
The efficiency gains of technological restraints upset these
expectations. The economics of the virtual world, although not cost
free, are far less prohibitive. Fewer choices must be made. A GPS tag
can generate more information about identity or location on far more
individuals than a fleet of officers on the beat. It is much simpler to
run DNA samples in a database than to pound the pavement looking
for witnesses. A camera affixed near a government landmark can
generate far more hits when linked to a database than can a police
officer monitoring the same traffic by sight. An online web search or
registry can offer up more information in a couple hours than could
be obtained the old-fashioned way in a couple weeks.
In short, the economics of technological control enable the
regulation of greater numbers of persons under less stringent
conditions for a longer period of time and to a greater degree than an

244. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 2 (“Corrections has become the Pentagon of the state
budgets, pushing other service priorities to the side and sending ostensibly conservative
governments into a massive buildup of debt.”).
245. A long literature documents and discusses the degree to which municipal and
individual decisionmaking is made with biased, racist, or improper motives. See, e.g., DAVID
COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
16–55 (2005) (detailing examples of biased policing); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1722–44 (2006) (noting inequalities in the lack of enforcement). But
even biased decision making is resource constrained.
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equivalent physical intrusion. Even setting aside the capacity to
cumulate restraints, which will be addressed in Section B, any single
technique of restraint can operate far more pervasively, and reach far
more extensively, than its physical-world analogue.
Yet because courts ignore the impediments of the physical world,
they likewise ignore the “net widening” that is enabled when its
246
constraints are lifted. Appraising the impact of a technological
restraint by comparing it to a physical analogue, when the physical
world does not dictate the economies of its use, undervalues its
potential effect on liberty.247 To return to the examples given at the
start of this Section: the face-scanned ballpark attendees could not all
have been individually interrogated—they would have been left
undisturbed unless they aroused some suspicion. The net-savvy
neighbor never would have gotten around to going downtown to
check the records in the first place. The crime scene eyewitness would
not have been able to identify every cup from which the suspect
sipped or the names of family members, including the suspect’s
previously unknown biological father. The GPS-tracked individual
would not have otherwise gone to jail, but rather would have
remained wholly free.
Compare, however, the Supreme Court’s assessment of the harm
wrought by the online posting of sex offenders’ biographical
information. The Court, analyzing the intrusiveness of the posting,
declared that “[t]he record in this case contains no evidence that the
Act has led to substantial occupation or housing disadvantages . . .
that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of routine
background checks.”248 The Court further reasoned that the process of
searching online “is more analogous to a visit to an official archive of
criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear

246. STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CLASSIFICATION 43 (1985). Relatedly, scholars have also reported on the effect of
“destructuring movements . . . aimed at decreasing the size, scope and intensity of the formal
deviancy control system,” such as diversion and deinstitutionalization programs. Id. Rather than
shrink the system, however, empirical study demonstrates that “the use of community
alternatives actually causes an overall system expansion which might not otherwise have
occurred.” Id. at 49.
247. Professor Lawrence Lessig has made the same observation with regard to cyberlaw
generally: “When the ability to search without burden increases, does the government’s power
to search increase as well?” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 17
(1999).
248. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003) (emphasis added).
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249
in public with some visible badge of past criminality.” In assessing
the harm, therefore, the Court dismissed as insignificant the
possibility of any change in the likelihood or frequency of intrusion;
the analysis centered instead upon whether the intrusion could have
occurred in the absence of the technology. In the Court’s own words,
online registration simply “makes the document search more
efficient, cost effective, and convenient”;250 it did not affect the very
meaning of the act of retaining a criminal record.
Yet reducing the difficulty of obtaining such records by placing
them online dramatically increases the likelihood, frequency, and
251
scope of their access, and in turn dramatically alters their impact.
The Internet is open twenty-four hours. It requires no bus fare, no
plane ticket, no copy card. It has no lines, or clerks on lunch break. A
virtual file cannot be checked out or lost as readily as it can in the real
world. And a database can be “trolled” and “fished” for information
interminably, whereas the same fishing expedition done in person
would likely incur the wrath of everyone else in line as well as the
staff.
The “visit to an official archive,” in contrast, would likely include
all of these impediments. The sheer inconvenience of obtaining paper
records thus imposes a de facto screening mechanism: only those
individuals deeply invested in obtaining particular information in fact
gain access to it. In removing these impediments, the government
changes the very meaning of its record keeping. A technically “public
record,” filed away in a drawer in a clerk’s office, is simply not
identical to the same record—in terms of its publicity—posted online.
Whether a record is kept in a drawer at a registry, posted all over
town on billboards, or placed on a website largely dictates its
publicity—not the label placed on it by law.
The Court’s own analogy in Smith reveals as much: one cannot
plausibly equate a website with an archive when, for instance, a
website might get hundreds of thousands of visitors a day, but the

249. Id. at 99 (rejecting the notion that any special significance should be accorded to the
fact that online publication magnified the harm by making readily available information that
was otherwise cumbersome to obtain).
250. Id.
251. For instance, sex offenders in Maine were killed by a Canadian who traveled from
Nova Scotia and had used the Internet to identify potential victims in Vermont, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Maine. David Hench, Sex Offender Registries Offer Insight,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1 (describing how the killer compiled a list
before leaving his home in Nova Scotia).
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typical county archive might not manage that many in a year. In this
respect, the claim that the website simply replicates the archive is
demonstrably false. Indeed, the Court itself has previously recognized
as much, noting that “[p]lainly there is a vast difference between the
public records that might be found after a diligent search of
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout
the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”252
This disjunction between the realities of the physical world and
those of the virtual world are evident across all technologies of
control. In the words of one commentator, “[t]echnical developments
drastically alter the economics of surveillance such that it becomes
253
much less expensive per unit watched.” Websites cost little to
maintain. DNA collection, storage, and processing are becoming less
expensive every day, and with automation the expense will continue
to drop precipitously. The eyes of biometric technologies can watch
far more cheaply than their human counterparts. GPS monitoring
costs as little as eight to twelve dollars a day;254 for the cost of one
incarcerated body, the government can track six people
electronically.255
Moreover, the computerization of information into databases—
whether genetic, biometric, biographical or geographical—activates
previously passive collections of acquired knowledge. Historically, to
say that a record was indefinitely retained did not mean that it was
nevertheless instantly available. The file went into the archives to be
stored in case it was needed in the future. But computerized methods
252. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764
(1989).
253. Ronald Corbett & Gary T. Marx, Critique: No Soul in the New Machine:
Technofallacies in the Electronic Monitoring Movement, 8 JUST. Q. 399, 400 (1991).
254. William Saletan, Call My Cell: Why GPS Tracking Is Good News for Inmates, SLATE,
May 7, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2118117. This sum compares to the estimated sixty-two
dollars per inmate daily it requires to incarcerate someone. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. As such requirements have swept the nation,
however, questions about the cost of effective implementation have been raised. See, e.g.,
Michael Rothfeld, Viability of Sex-Offender Law in Doubt, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at A1
(detailing the dispute within California over which agencies must shoulder the significant costs
of voter-enacted GPS-tracking laws).
255. Corbett & Marx, supra note 254, at 403 (noting that “[p]risons are very expensive
institutions, averaging (in 1987 dollars) between $50,000 and $75,000 per new cell for
construction and $14,000 for imprisoning one offender for a year”); STEPHAN, supra note 253, at
1 (reporting annual operating costs of state prisons at $22,650 per year per inmate).
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of record retention facilitate information exchange and transfer: the
file goes in the database, which can then easily be accessed, searched,
and shared. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in another context,
a significant change occurs when “scattered . . . bits of information”
are collected into a “compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain
information.”256 Instead of deploying its scarce resources to canvass
for suspects or interview witnesses in one case, the government can
run a biometric image or DNA sample and turn up a range of likely
candidates in an array of cases.
Indeed, unlike the level or even escalating costs of physical forms
of incapacitation, the cost of imposing a technological restraint may
decrease over its period of use. Although difficult to quantify, it may
be that the costs of technological restraints peak at implementation,
both structurally and individually, and then level off or even decline
after the initial capital outlay. For instance, although establishing a
national DNA database incurs significant costs, fewer expenditures
are required to maintain and operate it.257 Similarly, collecting and
testing a DNA sample requires funding, but once processed, only
258
minimal costs are necessary to store the sample and profile. Many
technologies even have built-in mechanisms for recouping their
expense: jurisdictions increasingly require solvent defendants to pay
for their own electronic tracking devices259 and DNA tests,260 or charge
a nominal fee for records searched online.261

256. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764 (finding privacy implicated in the FBI’s
dissemination of a rap sheet, which collected publicly available but dispersed conviction and
arrestee information into a single document).
257. See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 436, 442 (describing the high costs of clearing the
backlog of untested DNA and setting up databases, but noting the benefits of making that
investment).
258. See id. at 442–43 (describing Virginia’s initial need to rely on outsourcing to process its
samples until it cleared a backlog and “built . . . capacity”).
259. A number of states require tracked individuals to pay for their tracking. E.g., ALA.
CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-14 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.285 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-540
(2007). The same is true of many SCRAM programs. See Keeping Watch, supra note 56 (noting
that the “offender must pay the entire cost of participating in the [SCRAM] program, which
includes a refundable deposit of $100, a $75 installation fee and a daily fee of $12 for the
service”).
260. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COST STUDY OF
DNA TESTING AND ANALYSIS 12 (2006) (reporting on various ways in which states recoup
costs by imposing surcharges on convicted offenders or court penalties).
261. See supra Part I.C.
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This myth that technological restraints simply optimize the
conditions of the physical world, rather than enable greater degrees
of intrusion, in turn often serves to legitimize a second
misconception—that technological restraints are always preferable to
physical ones. That is, even assuming that technological restraints did
apply only in circumstances identical to a physical-world counterpart,
they still would not necessarily effectuate an equal, much less smaller,
deprivation. Naturally, if asked which is worse, targeted technological
surveillance or full-fledged incarceration, few would dispute that
surveillance presents the less offensive option. Many people may
prefer a year under electronic monitoring to a year in jail, or
providing a DNA sample or biometric image for search and storage in
a national database to being brought in for questioning.
Rephrase the question as a choice between one day of
incarceration and a year of intensive technological surveillance,
however, and choosing the least offensive option may appear more
complicated. Many people would likely trade a year in jail to avoid a
lifetime ban from their hometown or the indelible stigma of public
registration. And most people would likely accept the possibility that
the police may confront them if there is an individualized suspicion of
involvement in criminal activity rather than voluntarily contribute
their biological and biometric samples to a government database so
that they can be routinely ruled out as a suspect. There is a value in
not having to engage with government officials on a prolonged or
regular basis that may, in certain circumstances, transcend even the
value of personal physical liberty. Indeed, it is not for nothing that
262
some defendants actually prefer a jail term to probation, or that
most people dread engaging government bureaucracies over even the
most rudimentary of tasks such as securing a driver’s license or
picking up a package at the post office.

262. See State v. Cooley, 587 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Iowa 1998) (reporting that defendant
Michael Cooley did not desire the “problems and harassment” accompanying any form of
probation and therefore “would rather serve his [sic] whatever time he gets rather than being
put on probation for this”); Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at
E2 (reporting that actress Michelle Rodriguez, faced with the choice of going to jail for five days
or paying a $500 fine and spending 240 hours performing community service for a drunk driving
charge, chose jail saying “I kind of have to get back to my life”). Another celebrity, Kiefer
Sutherland, prioritized his ability to work over his personal freedom: he elected to serve a fortyeight-day jail sentence in two stints that would not conflict with the filming of his popular
television show, rather than a shorter period of time that would have interrupted the schedule.
Associated Press, ‘24’ Star Pleads No Contest in DUI Case, To Serve 48 Days, CNN.COM, Oct.
10, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/SHOWBIZ/TV/10/10/sutherland.arrested.ap.
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But the very same courts that use incarceration as the point of
comparison in assessing the harm wrought by a particular technology
in turn neglect to ask whether the technology was imposed with the
specificity or procedural protection remotely approximating that
required for the purportedly comparable physical deprivation. For
example, in In re Commitment of William P. Browning,263 a Texas
Court of Appeals addressed that state’s sexual predator commitment
act, which allowed for “outpatient” commitment using electronic
surveillance.264 The court compared the restrictions imposed—GPS
tracking, residence in a specific county, and treatment—to the
265
incarceration upheld by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks.
Observing that “the intrusion is far less restrictive than if he were
266
confined in a secure facility,” the court upheld the requirements as
“nonpunitive,” but it never considered whether the qualifying
processes for outpatient commitment were likewise identical to
involuntary inpatient commitment.267 Similarly, the large number of
sexual offenders currently required to submit to ten-year to lifetime
terms of GPS monitoring almost certainly could not all have been,
pursuant to the procedural standards imposed by the Supreme Court,
physically incarcerated.268
The same logic is evident with regard to online index cases. In
269
E.B. v. Verniero, for instance, the Third Circuit upheld a sex
offender registry, noting that dangerous sex offenders can be detained
both pretrial and postsentence through civil commitment
procedures.270 The court commented that, in contrast, “[a]ll Megan’s
Law mandates is registration and notification”271 and “[c]ertainly, in
terms of the impact on the everyday lives of registrants, the burden of

263. In re Commitment of William P. Browning, 113 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App. 2003).
264. Id. at 857.
265. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
266. In re Commitment of Browning, 113 S.W.3d at 859.
267. Id. at 858.
268. Physical commitment has been held constitutional if accompanied by fairly elaborate
procedural safeguards approximating those available in a criminal trial. Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407, 409 (2002); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366. But
the persons subject to technological surveillance are not necessarily limited to only those
adjudicated eligible for physical commitment. See supra Part I.
269. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997). This case focused on the original
“Megan’s Law,” named after a child who was brutally raped and murdered by a convicted sex
offender.
270. Id. at 1104–05.
271. Id. at 1102.

02__MURPHY.DOC

1374

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1321

this aspect of Megan’s Law pales by comparison to the civil
272
commitment of sex offenders.” Other courts have followed similar
reasoning, concluding that “[a]lthough we recognize that the duty to
register in person every 90 days for a minimum of ten years is
onerous, we do not believe that this burden is sufficiently severe to
transform an otherwise nonpunitive measure into a punitive one,”
because “the Supreme Court has consistently upheld far heavier
burdens . . . including deportation, termination of financial support,
and loss of livelihood.”273 Yet no court acknowledged that, the higher
burdens of the analogous condition also carried more stringent
procedural safeguards. Such protections, not the least of which is
individualized process—restrict the power of civil commitment or
deportation, whereas no such limitations circumscribed the
application of registration statutes, which generally apply indefinitely
and on the basis of categorical membership.
Conversely, courts have also failed to appraise the additional
burdens imposed by technological restraints that are lacking in the
case of their physical counterparts and which therefore might warrant
additional procedural protections. For instance, the Supreme Court in
addressing sex registries in Connecticut Department of Public Safety
specifically rejected the need for individualized assessments of
eligibility for regulatory registration statutes because the Court
claimed that, to the extent that any process was necessary, it had
already been provided in the criminal trial at which the defendant was
adjudicated guilty of an offense.274 Publication of an already public
offense, by itself, did not occasion any need for additional procedural
275
safeguards.
Yet the Court’s logic overlooks the fact that in enacting the
registry, the state is both demanding more and doing more than is
possible in the physical world. Online registries contain more
information, and saddle registrants with a greater burden, than the

272. Id. at 1105.
273. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997). Several courts have drawn the same
analogy. See, e.g., Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512, 519 (Mass. 1998) (“The
offenders in these cases do not face a potential loss of liberty . . . .”); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 982 (Pa. 2003) (“[T]he duties imposed . . . are not in themselves
sufficiently onerous to qualify as punishment.”).
274. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (“[T]he law’s requirements turn
on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a
procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest.”).
275. Id.
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simple historical fact of conviction. They demand constant, long-term
attention on the part of registrants, in that the individual must
periodically check in to verify information and provide current
photos, and must immediately inform the government of any material
276
changes in their status. The registries, in turn, consist of current and
updated repositories of information about the status, residence,
employment, and appearance of registered persons. This change in
both the breadth and the character of the availability of the
information constitute highly meaningful distinctions. Statutes that
allow the broadcast of public court proceedings—but give victims and
witnesses the opportunity to opt out—recognize as much.277 A public
proceeding that requires finding a parking space, locating the right
courtroom, and sitting through lunch breaks and irrelevant matters is
simply not the same thing as a public proceeding that requires no
more than flipping on the television and fast-forwarding to the
relevant part. Thus, confronting the issue in Smith, the Court wrongly
analogized an inquiry into a sex offender registry to “a visit to an
official archive,”278 because the “official archive” would not be open
twenty-four hours a day and have, as did the registry, a current photo
of the individual along with current information about the person’s
address, workplace, or other biographical characteristics.
In sum, the right story to tell about technological forms of
surveillance and control is not one of streamlining or one-for-one
substitution, but rather one of proliferation, expansion, and
enhancement. Blinded by the economics of the physical world, courts
overlook the far more productive economies of virtual control. And
focused on the strictures that govern what appears to be a more
restrictive physical alternative, courts neglect to ask whether the more
restrictive option would apply or, even if it did, whether any distinct
burdens of the technological restraint demand some special
procedural due process.

276. See supra Part I.C.
277. See Audrey Maness, Comment, Does the First Amendment’s “Right of Access” Require
Court Proceedings to Be Televised? A Constitutional and Practical Discussion, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
123, 147 & n.199 (2006) (“Many court rules also provide for exclusion of select testimony based
upon objections from certain classes of persons: namely, victims, informants, undercover agents,
relocated witnesses, or juveniles.”).
278. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003).
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B. Accumulation
The use of the physical world as the template for understanding
the effects of noncorporeal restraints on liberty obscures more than
just the net-widening effect of such restraints. It also can detract from
full analysis of the degree to which such restraints can cumulate.
Although each individual restraint may seem trivial in an isolated
appraisal, a comprehensive review, focused on the regulated subject
rather than a particular restraint, can reveal the true severity of such
measures’ potential reach. Discrete technological restraints on liberty
can accumulate and fully fetter an individual while remaining largely
disaggregated for purposes of assessing their effect.
That is, physical regulations of dangerous persons are easy to
map: the body is free in society, the body is restrained in prison. Even
when multiple legal forms of restraint operate—say, the same person
is released in a criminal matter but detained in an immigration
matter—the legal system can, and does, keep track of the actual
physical self. For example, a court has to order corrections to make
present the immigration-detained defendant to proceed in a criminal
trial, even if the defendant is fictionally “free” in that criminal case.
The institution of incarceration tracks the individual. The fiction of
physical freedom even retains legal import: if the immigration interest
dissipates, the physical self likewise will be freed.
But technological regulations operate virtually, fragmented from
one another and difficult to view cumulatively. For example, imagine
a hypothetical offender—say, a nineteen-year-old male convicted of
having sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. He finishes a jail term
as well as a period of supervised release. Yet he remains governed by
a web of technology-based surveillance requirements. Pursuant to a
series of nondetention-based statutes, his criminal record will be
placed online alongside his identifying information, home address,
place of work, photograph, and the make and model of his car. Once
every three months or so, he will have to spend the morning down at
the local law enforcement office, verifying his information or
providing an update. In between those visits, if he moves, or borrows
a car, or cuts his hair, he will have to notify law enforcement.
At the same time, his DNA and fingerprints will be stored in a
computer so that roughly one hundred thousand times a day, his
biometric profile will be checked for comparison with a crime-scene
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sample. His whole biological genome will sit in a police refrigerator,
subject only to bare and vague restrictions on its misuse.280 Perhaps his
facial features or license plate will be recorded electronically, so that
whenever he boards a plane or drives by a playground he can be
identified as a potential suspect. His every movement will be tracked
electronically so that the government can know his location at all
times. He may have to abide by zoning ordinances that prohibit him
from living near a school or visiting a public park—or perhaps even
any metropolitan area—and a GPS or biometric-based alert will
sound or barriers will go up if he accidentally travels within the
prohibited zones. In short, each time he enters the public sphere he
will risk exposure—to a security guard with a biometric scanner, to a
police officer who runs a crime scene cigarette butt through the
database, or to a web-surfing vigilante neighbor who thinks that
criminals like him should be chased out of town.
Despite all of these encumbrances, he will not only be considered
fully free in the eyes of the law, but he will also hardly even be
considered fettered. Had the state wished to incarcerate him
criminally, he would have received full criminal process. Had the state
sought civil incapacitation, say as a sexual offender or danger to the
community, it would have likewise needed to meet some measure of
heightened and individualized proof. But each of the regulations that
constitute his virtual prison will have triggered barely any attention,
and will almost certainly apply absent any individualized
determinations or formal limitations on duration or scope. None will
turn on any reference to, much less finding of, his likelihood of posing
any danger to society.
Moreover, even if he wanted to contest these restraints, this
fictional offender would have a hard time presenting to a court a
coherent, cumulative picture of his oppression. Each instance of
regulation—the online index, the DNA sample, the biometric image,
or the GPS bracelet—constitutes its own independent intrusion.
Considered separately, each may appear de minimis—no single

279. Nakashima, supra note 99 (“[A] request reaches an FBI server every second from
somewhere in the United States or Canada, comparing a set of digital fingerprints against the
FBI’s database of 55 million sets of electronic fingerprints. A possible match is made—or ruled
out—as many as 100,000 times a day.”).
280. Antony Barnett, Police DNA Database Is “Spiraling Out of Control,” OBSERVER
(London), July 16, 2006, at 4 (reporting scandals in England regarding a private company’s
retention of genetic samples sent to a lab for outsourced testing, as well as reports that the
Home Office gave permission for controversial genetic studies to be conducted on samples).
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281
measure presents as particularly burdensome or unreasonable. But
neither does any basis exist for considering them together: there is
simply is no legal claim of “it is all too much,” or even “put all
together, it is basically a form of jail.”
And even if the harm could be assessed cumulatively, there
would remain a practical impediment to objecting to each aspect of its
imposition. Technological restraints come to court cloaked in legal
claims of various stripes, often dictated by the way in which the
intrusion was imposed. First, each restraint may have a different
source of legal authority. For instance, the legislature might impose
282
DNA collection and electronic tracking requirements, whereas the
executive (say, the local police department) creates a biometric
283
database or online index. Without a single comprehensive statute to
challenge, or even necessarily a single source of legal authority to
point to, it can be difficult to make the case for a broad form of relief.
Second, these different sources of authority may express themselves
through different officers of implementation even within a particular
branch. The corrections office might take the DNA sample and affix
the GPS bracelet, the police department might monitor the tracking
data or run DNA database searches, and the parks or housing
department might issue the exclusion orders and snap the biometric
images.284
Moreover, across the states, the implementing authority can also
vary such that a different constellation of agencies and offices
285
regulate implementation of a particular program. For example, in a
2001 report on state sex offender registration acts that compiled an
appendix tracking the relevant authority for each state, a broad
catchall “other agency” category was necessary—second only to the
286
“State Patrol” category—to capture the administrative complexity.

281. One court noted that even within a single statutory regulation scheme, “looking at each
provision in isolation tends to artificially dilute the overall impact of the ordinance.” ACLU v.
City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
282. See supra notes 30–34, 66–68 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 52–53, 101–114 and accompanying text. Increasingly, however, states
have moved to enact legislation providing for GPS tracking of certain offenders. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4–123.92 (2007) (providing for “the continuous, satellite based monitoring of
sex offenders in this State”).
284. See Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Dealing with Disorder: Social Control in the
Post-Industrial City, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 10–16 (2008) (describing a wide
spectrum of official authorities capable of generating spatial exclusions).
285. See ADAMS, supra note 68, at 5.
286. Id.
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A single individual, required to meet a panoply of requirements
across several jurisdictions, would be incapable of presenting a
unitary claim. The caption of the case and name of the defendant will
likely differ for each technology and within each jurisdiction.
Third, the timing and nature of a legal challenge to one type of
technological restraint might be dictated by concerns that do not
apply equally to all other forms of restraint. For instance, if the
government purchases software that transforms a database of
already-obtained driver’s license images into a biometric resource,
then a regulated subject may be unaware of its use until a particular
intrusion occurs. Accordingly, challenges to such a technology might
occur piecemeal in criminal cases by individual defendants detained
or arrested after being identified by a positive scan. On the other
hand, if the government affirmatively seeks images from certain
segments of the population, or if legislation is enacted requiring that
certain classes of persons submit such images (as in the case of DNA
or offender registries, for instance), then a civil class action might
follow. In such a case, the practical ability to mount a comprehensive
challenge, based on a range of applicable technological restraints,
presents a formidable obstacle.
The litigation around these technologies reflects this complexity
in the legal bases for their challenges. Claims related to DNA
collection statutes, which have thus far primarily addressed DNA
collected from convicted offenders, have tended to raise Fourth
Amendment arguments in both criminal and civil cases, and ex post
facto or double jeopardy claims of previously convicted persons.287
Litigation on sex offender registration acts, meanwhile, has tended to
focus on equal protection or substantive or procedural due process
claims,288 although ex post facto and double jeopardy claims have
been raised as well.289
In no case, however, does it appear that an individual has
challenged multiple restraints—for instance, a sex offender

287. See supra Part II.
288. See Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (rejecting a host of state
constitutional challenges to the state’s registration act, including a substantive due process
claim).
289. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997); ACLU v. City of
Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding city’s sex offender
registration act against ex post facto, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment attack,
but striking certain provisions as violating federal constitutional substantive due process, equal
protection, and the Fourth Amendment).
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challenging registration, tracking, and DNA collection. There simply
is no obvious single legal mechanism for claiming that the
technological restraints, operating collectively, impose such a burden
290
that some sort of check is required.
C. Unaccountability
The harms wrought by technological restraints are difficult to
visualize not only because they are often diffused into component
fragments of regulation, but also because they may be imposed not by
the state itself directly, but by a third party. Although physical
punishment is the monopoly of the state,291 virtual punishment may be
meted out by the masses. If an individual cannot rent an apartment or
find a job because of an online record, who is responsible? If a
vigilante threatens to violently assault or even kill someone based on
a registry, who is responsible? If an airline prevents an individual
from boarding a flight because a commercial database contains
inaccurate information, who is responsible? Likely, not the state.
The state action requirement for constitutional challenges
permits the state to distance itself from the consequences of its use of
technological restraints.292 Whether it is a private employer denying a
job, a landlord denying housing, a community member defacing
property, or any of the myriad ways in which the regulated individual
may face violence or discrimination, it need not be attributable to
state action. Conversely, the state may collect information from third
parties and then evade any obligation to verify or correct it if
erroneous. For instance, because commercial databases are relied
290. Indeed, some courts expressly forbid a claim under one provision of the Constitution
when the same claim better fits another part of the Constitution. See, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start,
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must
be the guide for analyzing these claims.” (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
842 (1998))).
291. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION 2 (Fortress Press 1965) (1918)
(defining a state as an entity which claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in
a given territory); Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory
Model” of, or “Pathological Perspective” on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 199, 207 (1996) (“A monopoly on legitimate violence must be established in a
government, and that government must commit itself to respecting the law in exercising its
monopoly.”). But see Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 911
(2007) (reporting the emergence of an “alternative private criminal justice system”).
292. Simmons, supra note 291, at 911 (describing the limited operation of the state action
doctrine even with regard to private police).
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upon to generate no-fly lists, the government can “circumvent the
Privacy and Information Act” along with laws giving individuals the
293
right to see and challenge such information. Indeed, states and
localities have increasingly delegated a dimension of the police power
to private entities, so that for instance a quasi-public housing
development could use a registry to permanently bar individuals from
its grounds—without employing any formal process—and then seek
arrest in the case of subsequent trespass.294 The arrested individuals
have no basis upon which to defend against the trespass, even if the
barring notice were issued from their own homes and without notice
or the opportunity to be heard.295
In contrast, even in this era of privatization, the authority to
incarcerate the dangerous still rests solely with the state. Whatever its
actual efficacy in political terms, this power renders the government
democratically accountable for the harms it imposes on an individual.
Such accountability has legal resonance as well. In depriving an
individual of liberty the state in turn assumes a range of affirmative
duties to provide for the health, sustenance, shelter, and general
296
maintenance of its inmates, and the writ of habeas corpus provides
an avenue of relief from wrongful incarceration. When individuals are
sent to prison, it is unambiguous where they are, who sent them there,
and who is responsible for their continued welfare.

293. Dummer, supra note 94, at 268 (explaining that such databases are privately
maintained, and that no statutory regulation akin to the Fair Credit Reporting Act or other
watchdog-type legislation exists to entitle individuals to access to or correction of wrong
information); Linda L. Lane, The Discoverability of Sensitive Security Information in Aviation
Litigation, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 427, 427 (2006) (“A plaintiff’s inability to access Sensitive
Security Information (‘SSI’) often defeats that plaintiff’s claim that he was harassed or denied
boarding without cause.”).
294. Although this added layer of complexity is beyond the scope of this Article, an example
of such action is evident in Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003), in which the Supreme Court
addressed a “trespass notice” issued by the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority
(RRHA), id. at 117. The RRHA, a “political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia”
that operates a low-income housing project in Richmond, purchased a previously public street
from the city and then pursued trespass complaints against undesirable visitors to the
development. Id. at 116–18. Addressing a First Amendment claim based on the “unfettered
discretion” of the housing project’s manager to permanently ban visitors without any process or
recourse, id. at 121, the Court held the policy sufficiently legitimate to overcome an overbreadth
challenge, id. at 124.
295. Id.
296. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (holding that the state owes a duty of
care to those in its custody); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1981) (noting in a
due process claim by an institutionalized individual that “the State concedes that respondent has
a right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care”).
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But technology enables the state to delegate to the populace a
share of its role in monitoring and controlling the dangerous. And
even though monitoring technologies can approximate the harms
imposed by incarceration in that they restrict the ability to work,
associate, sleep, eat, and live as one chooses—generally speaking,
imposing a “[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy” similar to that
297
occasioned by jail —it will no longer technically be the government
that metes out the punishment. Accordingly, any harms suffered as a
result need not be its responsibility. The fictional offender described
in Section B, who has trouble working or finding an apartment or
even living without fear of random violence, will therefore lack
something retained by those incarcerated: the right to hold the state
accountable for affirmatively providing for his shelter, livelihood,
health, and safety.
Indeed, the closest avenue for challenging government actions
that adversely affect an individual as a result of the behavior of third
parties is to cite the reputational harm a regulation imposes.
Underlying the objection that a particular technique “stigmatizes” an
individual is the notion that, even if the government is not itself
oppressing or harming the person, it is approving or even inviting
such harm by third parties. Yet the claim that a government action
imposes “stigma” on an individual, or otherwise harms “reputation,”
has repeatedly been rejected by the Court. In Paul v. Davis,298 which
involved the distribution by police chiefs of a flyer displaying “active
shoplifters,” the Supreme Court held that “defamation, standing
alone,” does not deprive any protected liberty interest.299 In

297. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). See generally GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE
SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 63–83 (Atheneum Printing
1970) (1956) (documenting and cataloging the effects of imprisonment as a deprivation of
liberty, goods and services, sexual freedom, autonomy, and security).
298. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
299. Id. at 709. In fact, the Court in Paul used this basis to distinguish Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), which found a liberty interest in the purchase of liquor that
had been denied without due process when the chief of police posted a notice forbidding the
sale of liquor to the defendant for one year, id. at 433. The opinion suggested that the problem
was that the notice was “a stigma, an official branding of the person” in a “degrading” manner,
without prior notice or opportunity to be heard. Id. at 437. The Court held, “Where a person’s
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Id. But the Paul Court
reinterpreted the holding as not about stigma, finding that such an interpretation “could be
taken to mean that if a government official defames a person, without more, the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause . . . are brought into play.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 708.
Instead, the linchpin was that the state action caused “a right or status previously recognized by
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Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Court declared that
“mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute
300
the deprivation of a liberty interest.” And in Smith v. Doe, the
majority observed that any “attendant humiliation” or, for that
matter, violence, that resulted from the online registry was therefore
“but a collateral consequence” for which the state was not
301
responsible.
By disavowing stigma as a legally cognizable harm, the state can
brand the individual publicly while simultaneously disclaiming any
responsibility for public reaction. But this lack of accountability
enables serious incursions on liberty at a potentially high cost. As one
scholar has commented in the context of shame punishments, such
forms of delegation forge “an improper partnership between the state
302
and the crowd.” Delegation raises the specter of uncontrolled
303
violence and arbitrary imposition of punishment in that the
individual is in essence “compelled to dance with a madman,” and has
“no way to predict or control the way in which the public will deal
with him,” or any “rhyme or limit to the terms the public may
impose.”304
And indeed, such violence and arbitrary discrimination has
already occurred. Justice Souter, concurring in Smith v. Doe,
observed that “there is significant evidence of onerous practical
305
effects of being listed on a sex offender registry.” In support of this
claim, he cited evidence of “numerous instances in which sex
offenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of notification—
ranging from public shunning, picketing, press vigils, ostracism, loss of
employment, and eviction, to threats of violence, physical attacks, and
arson,”306 along with instances of “private, unlawful violence and
state law [to be] distinctly altered or extinguished.” Id. at 711. Because “any harm or injury to
that interest [in reputation] . . . does not result in a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
recognized by state or federal law,” it needs no procedural safeguarding. Id. at 712.
300. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003).
301. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003).
302. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J.
1055, 1059 (1998).
303. The debates surrounding the use of shaming penalties contain a parallel critique—
specifically, that such penalties “involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of the government,
to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general populace.” Id. at
1088.
304. Id. at 1090–91.
305. Smith, 538 U.S. at 109–10 n.* (Souter, J., concurring).
306. Id. (quoting Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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threats” that “happen with sufficient frequency and publicity that
307
registrants justifiably live in fear of them.” One couple in California
sued the seller of a home they purchased, claiming he should have
308
disclosed that he was a registered sex offender.
Equally as troubling, the repercussions of these tools of
surveillance are amplified in this age of information. Some general
label of dangerousness may matter less when it is restricted by
person-to-person contact—such as in a small town, where everyone
knows the local felon who in turn either tolerates the ostracism or
moves far enough away that a reputation is not likely to follow. But in
a global society, such restraints can seriously inhibit freedom. More
and more, individuals are constructed as compilations of abstract data
309
in “digital dossiers.” Once labeled as a transgressor, it no longer is
plausible to move towns or switch jobs to avoid permanent adverse
consequences, much less stop driving or flying or going to the
supermarket altogether. Regulatory provisions easily combine to
force a life out of the public eye, which in these days may very well be
impossible. Public isolation—whether due to the officers who always
pick the same car to pull over on the highway or the employer who
denies the only eligible job—can vastly impair the ability of an
individual to live any kind of ordinary life.
D. Invisibility
Finally, technological restraints differ from their physical
counterparts in that they acquire control over the regulated individual
largely through the threat of sanction, rather than through the
imposition of the sanction itself. Because they realize an abstracted
form of disciplinary control, they are less visible and transparent.310 Of
course, some techniques exert manifest, evident power: a tracking
307. Id. (quoting E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Brief for
Office of the Pub. Defender for the State of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae at 7–21, Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729) (noting past instances of physical assault and harassment).
308. Eric Louie, Seller’s Sex-Offender Status Angers Alamo Home Buyers, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, (Cal.) May 29, 2007, at A3.
309. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 16, at 1084; see also MARK POSTER, THE SECOND
MEDIA AGE 90 (1995) (“With databases, most often, the individual is constituted in
absentia . . . .”).
310. Many have written, perhaps most famously Michel Foucault, on the disciplinary power
of panoptic institutions. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 215–16 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (describing the formation of a “disciplinary
society” characterized by “an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’” that
evolves from formal institutions of power or control).
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device or biometric tool might foreclose access (or at least alert others
of unauthorized access) to certain places or activities. If the gate
comes down on the wayward sex offender too close to a school or the
barricade rises to cordon off the car with the errant license plate, then
a physical exertion of control undoubtedly occurs.
But technologies of detection are also ones of noncorporeal
restraint. GPS tracking or online indexing or biometric or DNA
databasing need not physically curtail the individual’s ability to move
through society freely, because they achieve their deterrent and
311
incapacitating effect through their capacity to sanction. They
“control a specific population by confining them, not within
geographical space, but through the dispersed trap of enhanced
detection.”312 Like Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon,313
technological restraints are both visible (in that the subjects know
they might be watched) and unverifiable (in that they do not know
when they are being watched). This virtual exercise of the state’s
power can in fact “render its actual exercise unnecessary.”314
Consider DNA typing and databasing—likely the most detective,
rather than preventive, technique of those discussed here. Arguably
DNA databases can do no more than link offenders to completed
crimes; they are not methods of physical incapacitation or of strict
crime prevention. But in fact genetic databasing constitutes a
powerful means of preventive restraint in the form of deterrence. It
interposes the watchful eye of the state between the offender and the
potential offense. As one scholar vividly describes, DNA databases
represent “nothing short of a spectral intervention into criminal
activity by forming the permanent shadow of an ever-present
witness.”315 This patrolled subject is self-circumscribing—“[h]e who is
subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play

311. Indeed, in contrasting penal confinement with nonrestraining punishments, Professor
Frank Zimring observed that “[t]he distinction between influence and control is somewhat
moderated when temporal limits are imposed on incapacitation and when a quick response
potential is built into monitoring systems.” FRANK ZIMRING, INCAPACITATION 157 (1995).
After all, “well-designed monitoring systems that can respond rapidly to initial deviance may
exercise more effective control over a population in the middle term than intermittent periods
of secure confinement.” Id.
312. Williams & Johnson, supra note 17, at 11.
313. FOUCAULT, supra note 310, at 200.
314. Id. at 201.
315. Williams & Johnson, supra note 17, at 12.
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316
spontaneously upon himself.” Throwing away a soda can in a public
trash bin becomes an assertion of territory, rather than a transient
event.
In this respect, technological methods of regulating dangerous
individuals exercise control not by cabining the capacity of the
individual to self-actuate, but by narrowing the landscape in which
one may do so without an actual or perceived risk of interference by
others or the state.317 That is why calls for a universal DNA database
318
have been largely rejected, and likely will always be—not because
the vast majority of the population actually anticipates committing a
crime in the future and hopes to avoid detection, but because even
the most law-abiding of individuals can experience the threat of (even
false) exposure as oppressive. It is that oppression—the omnipresent
eye of the state—that embodies the harm done by technological
restraints. A SCRAM–bracelet wearer’s inability to use perfume or
mouthwash is not the gravitas of injury; it is the constant fear of
detection, exposure, or capture.
Philosopher Isaiah Berlin expresses this idea in his definition of
liberty as a dual concept: “positive freedom,” which “consists in being
one’s own master,”319 and “negative freedom,” or the freedom of “not
being interfered with by others.”320 “Positive freedom” embodies the
desire to “be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being
decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external

316. FOUCAULT, supra note 310, at 202. Foucault noted that the patrolled subject “becomes
the principle of his own subjection.” Id. at 203.
317. In this respect, it is the object of controlling information, rather than the means by
which it is controlled, that matters. Professor Mark Poster observes that:
Properly understood the panopticon is not simply the guard in the tower but the
entire discourse/practice that bears down on the prisoner, one that constitutes him or
her as a criminal. The panopticon is the way the discourse/practice of the prison
works to constitute the subject as a criminal and to normalize him or her to a process
of transformation/rehabilitation. My argument is that, with the advent of
computerized databases, a new discourse/practice operates in the social field, a superpanopticon if you will, which reconfigures the constitution of the subject.
POSTER, supra note 309, at 85.
318. See, e.g., Nigel Morris, A ‘Chilling’ Proposal for a Universal DNA Database,
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/
is_20070906/ai_n19519872; Weiss, supra note 35, at A1. But see D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith,
DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide
Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 415 (2003).
319. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131
(1969).
320. Id. at 122–23.
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321
nature . . . .” It is the freedom of self-direction and self-realization.
In contrast, “negative freedom” acknowledges that “a frontier must
be drawn between the area of private life and that of public
322
authority.” It is this “minimum area of personal freedom” that is a
necessary precondition to positive freedom, or to creating the
conditions in which an individual can be “a being with a life of his
323
own to live.” Professor Robert Post describes a similar interest in
the maintenance of “the forms of respect deemed essential for social
life.”324 He specifically distinguishes this critical sphere of autonomous
will from abstract notions of intimacy or seclusion, and relates it
325
wholly to the formation and preservation of the independent self.
When the state imposes physical incarceration, it strips the
individual of both types of freedom: the prisoner loses both the
capacity for self-determination and the right to noninterference. But a
state using technologies to regulate a dangerous person, in contrast,
leaves the former interest largely untouched while greatly
326
undermining the latter. An individual who must wear a GPS
bracelet, supply updated biographical information to an online index,
or submit to genetic or biometric surveillance is not, it is true,
prevented by the state from self-direction. Indeed, courts repeatedly
focus upon this positive freedom in justifying the technological
intrusion, noting for instance in the sex offender registration statute
cases that “[a]lthough registrants must inform the authorities after

321. Id. at 131.
322. Id. at 124 (noting this is so even if “[w]here it is to be drawn is a matter of argument”).
Berlin also clarifies that this concept of self-actualization refers only to limitations placed by
others; the inability to self-realize due to limitations of one’s own self, or of the physical world,
does not count. Id. at 122.
323. Id. at 126–27.
324. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 971 (1989).
325. Id. (adding that the common law is “relatively indifferent to whether particular forms
of respect should be denominated as ‘privacy’”). Professor Post writes, “An individual’s ability
to press or to waive territorial claims, his ability to choose respect or intimacy, is deeply
empowering for his sense of himself as an independent or autonomous person.” Id. at 973.
326. Professor Mark Poster, drawing upon Foucault’s analysis of the Panopticon as a
discourse of disciplinary power, has observed that databases are “a new discourse/practice
operat[ing] in the social field, a super-panopticon if you will, which reconfigures the constitution
of the subject.” POSTER, supra note 309, at 85. Although Poster’s comments relate only to
databases, and include all forms (not just public regulatory) of databases, his observations that
“[c]omputerized databases are nothing but performative machines, engines for producing
retrievable identities” ring particularly true in the context of preventive regulation of the
dangerous. Id. at 89.
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they change their facial features (such as growing a beard), borrow a
car, or seek psychiatric treatment, they are not required to seek
327
permission to do so.”
But though technological restraints may generally leave positive
liberty relatively unimpaired, they wholly decimate the experience of
“negative freedom.” It is this essential attribute of liberty that is
roundly ignored by courts. For instance, the Seventh Circuit upheld
an unlimited, lifetime ban of one particular convicted sex offender
from all public parks in a city’s jurisdiction; the ban took a form no
more elaborate than a letter issued on the basis of a request by a
police chief to the park superintendent.328 Examining the “liberty
interest” at stake, the court discarded any interest in “a generalized
right to movement” or “to travel through parts of the City to engage
in religious, political, commercial and social activities.”329 The banned
individual claimed he wanted to enter the parks to “play softball,
watch the Colt World Series, attend a company outing if one takes
place at one of the City’s parks and take walks with friends,” an
interest labeled by the court as the “right to enter the parks to loiter
or for other innocent purposes.”330 The court upheld the banning
letter,331 finding such a right, although “not unimportant,” not
332
“fundamental” and observing that “[t]he historical and precedential
support for a fundamental right to enter parks for enjoyment is, to
put it mildly, oblique.”333
Of course, one easily imagines that this list was not exhaustive.
Surely the asserted interest was not seriously measured best as a

327. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Femedeer v. Haun,
227 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]hey are nevertheless free to live where they choose,
come and go as they please, and seek whatever employment they may desire.”).
328. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
329. Id. at 769.
330. Id. at 769 & n.11.
331. Id. at 771. The court added that Doe “cites no case, state or federal, that has held that
the right to enter the park to loiter or for other enjoyment purposes is ‘fundamental.’” Id. The
court disputed that the plurality in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), intended “in
this statement any type of fundamental rights analysis,” City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 772. The
court then cited scholarly discussion of the dissenters in Morales, who accused the majority of
claiming that “fundamental rights” liberty for substantive due process was distinguishable from
“liberty interests” in procedural due process. Id. at 772 n.13 (citing 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.5,
at 52 (3d ed. Supp. 2004)).
332. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 770.
333. Id. at 771.
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desire to engage in a certain specified activity like watching a ball
game. The true nature of the claim was the right to enter parks
334
without having to justify or explain the decision to the government.
In the words of Professor John Hart Ely, the right in question was one
“to keep the government from disrupting our lives without at least
moderately convincing justification.”335
Interestingly, in a decision concerning appellate review of federal
sentencing, the Supreme Court lightly gestured in the direction of
recognizing the nature of such an entitlement.336 In upholding a
probationary sentence given in place of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines’ recommendation of a term of years, the Court found no
abuse of discretion in part because a probationary sentence involves a
“substantial restriction of freedom.”337 Observing that “custodial
sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences
of equivalent terms,” the Court nonetheless remarked that
requirements to report regularly, seek permission to change addresses
or jobs, and curtail certain undesirable associations in fact
“substantially restrict [probationers’] liberty.”338 Although not framed
in constitutional terms, the Court’s willingness to acknowledge a
liberty interest framed in autonomy, rather than physical freedom,
underscores Professor Ely’s intuition about such deprivations and

334. The district court even cited the fact that Doe had not entered a park for innocent
purposes in ten years as support for its argument that the right was not fundamental. Doe v.
City of Lafayette, 160 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002 (N.D. Ind. 2001). Of course, such reasoning
undermines the value of freedom from government interference by presenting liberty as a useit-or-lose-it entitlement. Another case similarly reveals the cramped definition of liberty
currently espoused by the courts. The Sixth Circuit addressed a public housing project’s practice
of issuing “barring orders” that prohibit individuals from entering the property, even upon
invitation of a guest. See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2001). The “notrespass” lists are formulated by the housing authority’s vice president, with “no formal set of
written criteria to determine who should be placed on the list.” Id. at 403. There is no review of
a decision to ban, and the banning notices “do not inform the individual of the reason for the
ban, do not place a time limit on the ban, and do not advise the recipient how he or she may
seek to be removed from the list.” Id. at 404. In fact, “[n]o established procedure exists to
remove individuals from the no-trespass list.” Id. Violators are arrested and prosecuted for
trespassing. See id. In rejecting the defendant’s procedural due process claim, the court noted
that the policy affected no cognizable liberty interest. Id. at 407–08. After acknowledging the
fundamental right to “carry on certain intimate or private relationships,” the court observed
that there was no “constitutional protection to mere visitation with family members,” or general
right to “freedom of movement.” Id. at 406–07.
335. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 96 (1980).
336. See Gall v. United States, No. 06-7949, slip op. at 9–10 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007).
337. Id. at 9.
338. Id.
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stands in stark contrast to the Court’s reasoning in cases such as those
339
involving the sex offender registration statutes.
Another instructive analogue might be found in the litigation and
literature surrounding the recent proliferation of outpatient-civil
340
commitment statutes. These statutes typically allow states to seek
outpatient commitment, which may mean as little as requiring that an
individual attend a monthly counseling session or as much as daily
treatment and medication, as a prophylactic means of preventing
341
decomposition. Setting aside the wisdom of such laws, not even
their staunchest advocates nor the courts that have addressed them
deny that such regulations, however trivial an incursion into positive
342
liberty, constitute a serious intrusion upon negative liberty. Yet the
inherent recognition of this intrusion relates more to ideals of
autonomy and noninterference than to the simple fact that a person
must physically appear at the hospital once a month or even ingest
certain prescribed medications.
Likewise, the interest infringed by GPS monitoring is not the
ability to decide to go into the bookstore or to drive a certain route
home or to stay out until four in the morning; it is the capacity to
make those choices without thinking “this will be noticed, and what
343
will they think?” Online indexes or biometric collections likewise
minimally affect positive liberty—requiring only that the offender
check in once every three months or submit to a scan or swab—but
they greatly impinge upon negative freedom by intruding upon the
autonomous sphere in which the individual makes decisions about
how to live, work, travel, eat, or wear one’s hair.
To be clear, this impairment of negative liberty is not just
suffered by the malfeasant, afraid of apprehension and surveillance.
Rather, it inheres in the power of watching and is shared equally
339. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003); see also id. at 100–01 (emphasizing that
registry regime does not curtail ability to engage in any activities, but merely requires regular
reports about them).
340. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 401–02 (2006).
341. Id. at 402 n.42.
342. See, e.g., In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 486-87 (N.Y. 2004) (finding due process standard
met by statutory scheme for outpatient commitment).
343. Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 310, at 201 (“The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple
exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a
collection of separated individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by a
multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of view of the inmates, by a
sequestered and observed solitude.”).

02__MURPHY.DOC

2008]

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

PARADIGMS OF RESTRAINT

1391

among both “good” and “bad” subjects. It relates not to the fear of
fair apprehension, but rather to the subjugation of the autonomous
344
self and the fear of erroneous ascription or unexpected violence.
Can even the most law-abiding individual freely decide to leave the
house when aware that every movement will be recorded by GPS and
compared against the day’s crime scenes,345 or that roughly one
hundred thousand times a day a biometric profile will be checked
346
against crime scene samples?
Indeed, it is worth noting that as to the latter concern, such fears
are well-founded. Online indexes also have an alarming tendency to
347
contain outdated or inaccurate information. And the harms suffered
by those required to register publicly as sex offenders have been well
348
documented. Perhaps most dramatic and notorious is the murder of
two sex offenders by a vigilante in Maine in 2006.349 The killer, who
hailed from Canada, located and identified each offender according
to an online profile that contained the offenders’ pictures, addresses,
and other personal information. One of the victims was a young man

344. Cf. Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that
the statute did not require proof of actual damages to privacy to recover liquidated damages);
Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 645, 691 & n.205 (2004) (describing the widespread use of informants in low-income
communities as engendering “a kind of personal and social ‘malaise, described by some as a
form of schizophrenia, which developed in response to the permanent suspicion that one might
be under surveillance’” (quoting BARBARA MILLER, NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND
COMPLIANCE IN UNIFIED GERMANY: STASI INFORMERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY 133
(1999))); Post, supra note 324, at 960 (noting that court found the “gravamen of the plaintiff’s
cause of action rested solely on the intrusive installation of the offensive device” by the
landlord, rather than on the actual listening to conversations (citing Hamberger v. Eastman, 206
A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964))); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 487–
88, 518 (2006) (describing cases that recognize a privacy interest founded in security of
information).
345. California apparently has a collaborative program between sheriff’s departments and
the Department of Corrections that compares tracking and crime scene data for certain
parolees. Janicki, supra note 47, at 295–96.
346. Nakashima, supra note 99.
347. Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales¸ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2006, at A1 (reporting that “real expungement is becoming significantly harder to accomplish in
the electronic age,” because large commercial databases contain so many improperly retained
records).
348. See supra Part III.C.
349. John R. Ellement & Suzanne Smalley, Sex Crime Disclosure Questioned, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2006, at A1; see also Gregory D. Kesich, Killings Rekindle Vigilante Debate;
Critics Say that Federally Mandated Sex Offender Registries Waste Resources and Invite
Harassment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 19, 2006, at A1 (listing other instances of
vigilantism).
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whose only conviction was for having consensual sex with his
350
girlfriend when she was fifteen.
Moreover, consider the range of scandals concerning
mishandling and malfeasance in DNA typing that has resulted in
wrongful arrests and incarceration. In Houston, a DNA analyst
falsely implicated teenager Josiah Sutton in a murder; he served four
351
and a half years in prison until another test exonerated him. At a
Las Vegas lab, a technician mislabeled the samples, resulting in a
352
wrongful accusation of double rape. A Virginia laboratory botched
two DNA tests for Earl Washington, Jr., allowing him to linger on
death row until a 2004 test exculpated him.353 In Michigan, the blood
of a then four-year-old who lived one hundred miles from the crime
scene showed up in the forensic testing of a twenty-year-old murder
case.354 And in Illinois, a woman charged with a crime on the basis of
DNA evidence was exonerated after she supplied the perfect alibi:
355
she was in jail in Nevada at the time.
Yet in assessing the risks posed by public dissemination of
current biographical data of sex offenders, the courts label negative
356
effects as mere “conjecture.” Similarly, courts have dismissed the
potential for misuse in the collection and retention of genetic samples
as merely speculative, and have admonished litigants to make
arguments based “not on dramatic Hollywood fantasies but on
357
concretely particularized facts.” In short, courts roundly dismiss any

350. Kesich, supra note 349, at A1; see also Judy Harrison, Deaths of Gunman, Sex
Offenders Probed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 19, 2006, at A1.
351. See Murphy, supra note 27, at 767 & n.202.
352. Id. at 755 n.154 (citing Glenn Puit, Police Forensics: DNA Mix-Up Prompts Audit at
Lab, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 19, 2002, at B1).
353. Id. at 756 n.155.
354. Id. at 755 n.151.
355. Scandals have likewise raged outside of the United States. In Australia, forensic testing
in a child murder case turned up a clear suspect profile, which matched an unquestionably
uninvolved rape victim whose DNA had been tested in connection with her own assault. Id. at
755 n.153. In the United Kingdom, it emerged that the Forensic Science Service authorized
twenty research studies on DNA samples it had collected and that a private company, which was
contracted to process DNA, had retained samples and demographic data. Barnett, supra note
280.
356. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).
357. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In Johnson v.
Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir 2006), the court held that “[n]othing in the record suggests
such future testing is imminent, nor can we analyze its invasiveness until it appears,” id. at 500.
One state court curtly concluded that the “assertion that the state might misuse the information
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risk of injury as hypothetical and noncognizable, even in the face of
evidence of actual injuries, and therefore disregard any associated
effect on liberty.
E. Summary
In sum, the use of physical incapacitation as the comparative
standard for assessing the impact of noncorporeal restraints on liberty
not only fails to capture, but also actively obscures, profound
concerns raised by the use of new technological means of control.
That is certainly not to suggest that technological restraints are
inherently more troubling than physical ones; it is just to say that they
should be treated neither as equivalents nor as somehow inherently
less onerous. Rather, regulatory incapacitation raises specific
concerns of proliferation, accumulation, unaccountability, and
invisibility that ought to consciously animate inquiries into the
legitimacy of such restraints.
IV. “DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES”:
NEW PARADIGMS OF LIBERTY AND RESTRAINT
Respondent . . . expresses the generalized view that . . . ‘twenty-four
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible,
without judicial knowledge or supervision.’ But . . . if such dragnettype law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether
358
different constitutional principles may be applicable.

Having outlined the distinct perils of proliferation, accumulation,
unaccountability, and invisibility that technological restraints on
liberty pose, it remains to ask how recognition of those concerns
might change the kinds of questions asked by courts in reviewing the
use of such restraints. Implicit in this task, however, is the assumption
that courts should undertake such questioning. Some scholars
question whether the judicial branch is an appropriate or effective
check on executive and legislative punitiveness or zeal, and still
others argue that courts are particularly ill suited to review the use of
new technologies. This Part first makes the case that courts can and
derived from his DNA samples, when he makes no allegations of any specific misuse, fails to
state a justiciable controversy.” Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996).
358. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added) (addressing the placement of an electronic device to surreptitiously track movement).
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should engage in constitutional scrutiny of targeted technological
restraints on liberty. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to
engage fully in this debate, this Part nonetheless endeavors to
respond to some of the chief arguments against such intervention.
This Part then considers how such review ought to proceed.
A. The Case for Constitutional Regulation
Most observers of the criminal justice system agree that
legislatures, and to some extent executive branch officials, have
become too punitive towards criminals and too complacent in
regulating invasive policing.359 But a significant body of work—mainly
concerning the proper scope of the Fourth Amendment—disputes
whether the current state of criminal justice can be blamed on, or
cured by, close judicial oversight.360 Professor William Stuntz has
argued that the close constitutional supervision of criminal procedure
initiated in the era of the Warren Court actually corrupted the system
by compromising the incentives of the other branches.361 Other
scholars have responded that the current state of the criminal justice
system, although undoubtedly messy, would likely have only been
messier absent important and worthwhile judicial intervention.362

359. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 781–82 (2006) (“[o]vercriminalization, excessive punishment, racially skewed drug
enforcement, overfunding of prisons and underfunding of everything else” are “familiar political
problems” on the criminal justice landscape).
360. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights As a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CAL. L. REV. 929, 930 (1965) (arguing as early as 1965 that “the Court . . . ought to realize there
is danger in moving too far too fast; and that the statesmanship it has generally exhibited calls
for a pause until the legislative process has had a fair chance to react to its great initiatives”).
361. See Stuntz, supra note 359, at 785 (“Current constitutional law makes the politics of
criminal justice worse: more punitive, more racist, and less protective of individual liberty.”).
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505 (2001) (detailing ways in which procedural entitlements perversely affect executive and
legislative decision making). Stuntz instead advocates less procedural regulation by courts and
greater substantive scrutiny of legislative measures. Id.
362. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, First Causes and the Dynamics of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 131, 139 (2006) (observing that hoping the legislature would step in to
regulate more positively in the absence of judicial regulation “requires many leaps of faith about
what the public will allow judges to do and what legislators will be willing to do”); David Alan
Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 61 (2006) (arguing
that “the ways in which Americans (and their elected representatives) ‘value both privacy and
process more than they once did’—have more than a little to do with the parallel changes in
constitutional law, and the causation likely runs in both directions” and pointing out that when
the Court “has left the political branches with a blank slate regarding the regulation of law
enforcement, the slate has tended to remain blank”); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H.
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Professor Donald Dripps has suggested that legislative apathy—or
even antipathy—toward criminal defendants is not a consequence of
interbranch dynamics but rather simply a product of ordinary public
choice failures in that a priori, most constituencies identify as law
363
abiding not lawbreaking.
This controversy has played out even more robustly in the
specific context of judicial supervision of new technologies. Typically,
the conversation centers on how broadly the Fourth Amendment
should regulate claims related to investigative policing. Some scholars
urge increased judicial oversight in light of the aggressive assault on
364
privacy that such technologies represent. Others suggest that new
technologies constitute particularly poor candidates for such review
both as a descriptive and normative matter because courts are poorly
positioned to assess emerging issues and lack the flexibility to adapt
365
readily to unanticipated situations.
Rather than rehash the well-trodden paths carved out by these
debates, this Section aims to anticipate and counter the primary
arguments that might particularly arise in the context of judicial
regulation of targeted technological restraints. Specifically, critics
might contend that the determination to impose civil regulatory
restraints, and the scope of their application, should be left to the
legislative branches, which are better situated in terms of
accountability, flexibility, and competence. After all, technology has
ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.8(c) (2d ed. 1999) (reviewing various
theories explaining the Supreme Court’s protection of constitutional rights and noting that the
notion that the Court is “protecting minorities” has “substantial force”).
363. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1093 (1993) (“[T]he class of persons at risk from false positives is
relatively small and restricted to a diffuse and politically disinterested segment of society. The
class of people at risk from false negatives is very large, and quite sensibly frightened about
crime. Their interests are supported by a professional class with a very intense interest in the
outcome of legislative decisions regarding criminal justice.”).
364. See, e.g., Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 16, at 1126–27 (defending the warrant
requirement and the role of Fourth Amendment enforcement as a “neutral and external
oversight of the executive branch’s power”); see also Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 803
n.7 (2004) (collecting citations).
365. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 364, at 857–82 (arguing that Fourth Amendment law fails to
effectively regulate intrusive technologies and also that, from an institutional competence
perspective, “[c]ourts tend to be poorly suited to generate effective rules regulating criminal
investigations involving new technologies”); Stuntz, supra note 209, at 1265 (suggesting that the
enactment of statutes designed to fill gaps left by the courts in regulating privacy demonstrates
that, if left unregulated by courts, legislatures will step in and provide the necessary safeguards).
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upended conventional notions of liberty and privacy for every
member of society, not just those labeled “dangerous.” In a world
filled with Google searches and street cameras, as well as publicly
available mortgage and professional disciplinary information, the
presumptive cloak of anonymity has been lifted from daily life. The
four fears enumerated in Part III attend the use of red light–running
cameras or E-ZPass chips—or any other generally applicable
technology—just as much as they do restraints targeted at particular
classes of persons.
But regardless of whether wisdom counsels special attention to
the use of invasive technology against the general population,
technological regulations that are targeted in nature constitute
distinctly strong candidates for judicial attention. General society,
however beset by technological intrusions, retains some democratic
power to reclaim a measure of its liberty—whether through the wallet
or the ballot box. By contrast, targeted technologies specifically
isolate particular subgroups, thereby diminishing the probability of
effective democratic safeguards.
At the same time, the regulatory zeal of the state reaches its
zenith with regard to the exercise of its police power. Indeed,
“[p]ublic hatred of crime and criminals invites the use of extreme
forms of governmental power to suppress and punish criminals.”366
Targeted technological restraints mimic, even if they do not replicate,
the violence inherent in the relationship between the state and the
physically incarcerated individual.367 The same arguments that favor
the exercise of judicial control over the penal apparatus of the state
equally favor judicial oversight with regard to efforts to marshal
technological restraints for the same end.368 Indeed, if anything, close

366. Frank Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Democracy and the Limits of Punishment: A
Preface to Prisoners’ Rights, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 157, 157 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2004); see also Dripps, supra note 291, at 210 (observing that the government “can circumvent
the procedural safeguards of the criminal process” by “resort[ing] to a civil sanction for conduct
that is widely despised in the community”).
367. Cf. Dripps, supra note 291, at 216 (“[I]f the government resorts to institutions that both
restrain and blame, it is appropriate to subject these nominally different institutions to the
criminal procedure safeguards, for those safeguards respond to the very political risks posed by
the institutional innovation.”); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 84 (“A much more robust limitation
on ‘civil’ deprivations of liberty can be suggested. That limitation is, I argue, implicit in the
foundational principles that frame the relation between government and the individual.”).
368. Significantly, this position is consistent with the argument that constitutional criminal
procedure should “reorient” itself from an unhealthy and ritualistic preoccupation with privacy
to instead focus on the real locus of concern: coercive and abusive government power. William
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regulation of criminal restraints urges closer scrutiny over regulatory
ones, since “as the criminal sanction becomes hedged with safeguards
against abuse, a malign government may attempt to circumvent those
369
safeguards by resorting to purportedly civil processes.”
Some scholars have commented that the capacity of technologies
to concentrate their impact constitutes an improvement over the
bluntness of the police power when wielded in its physical forms. This
line of argument claims that technology allows intrusive policing to
focus acutely on suspicious areas or individuals, which in turn
decreases the amount or degree of intrusion that the general populace
370
must endure. A checkpoint in the park aimed at identifying sex
offenders is inconvenient and unnerving, but most park visitors will
not even notice that the park ranger has installed a camera that links
to a database of known sex offenders and will sound an alert when
one walks into the park. The same can be said for no-fly lists or DNA
collection or GPS devices. After all, if technology can identify those
persons in the security queue that have suspicious histories or
backgrounds, then the rest of the passengers can get through the
airport with far fewer insults to their dignity or time-management
needs.
But because targeted restraints, by their nature, affect only a
discrete and insular minority—typically, convicted or accused
criminal offenders, and those misfortunate enough to share those
offenders’ names or facial structures—they leave the majority of the
body politic undisturbed. Thus, even if, as some argue, a collection of
“potential criminal suspects” or “potential government targets” might
be able to generate some measure of political clout,371 no equally
J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1069,
1076–78 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem] (reviewing contradictory doctrines). It is
also consistent with the argument that the heavy lifting for constitutional criminal procedure
might better be done by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, rather than by the
Fourth Amendment or Bill of Rights generally. Stuntz, supra note 359, at 821.
369. Dripps, supra note 291, at 208.
370. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 570
(2005) (noting that computer searches may become less invasive as technology allows officials to
pinpoint exactly the kinds of files they need); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response
to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 682 (2004) (noting that invasions of electronic privacy may
reduce the need for invasions of physical privacy, for instance in the context of data mining for
no-fly lists).
371. Stuntz, supra note 359, at 795 (arguing that in fact “criminal suspects are a powerful
interest group” and attributing legislative failures to protect the rights of criminal defendants to
aggressive judicial constitutional intervention). But see Weisberg, supra note 362, at 134
(“[T]here is an important, if nuanced, difference between that portion of the populus that gets
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powerful constituency protects the isolated subgroup. The harm and
inconvenience of the technology will truly be visited only upon those
few (innocent or guilty) who find themselves repeatedly picked out of
the crowd by law enforcement on the basis of a selectively applied
technique. That number, inevitably, will be far smaller than the larger
political constituency likely necessary to rally against such invasive
uses. And the remainder of the population, even if they can imagine
falling under government suspicion,372 may find the very targeted
nature of such methods to be proof of their general efficacy and enjoy
the benefit that freedom from generally applicable measures
provides.
In addition, to the extent that the targeted groups are largely
comprised of once convicted criminal offenders, they likely reflect the
373
least politically powerful group in every imaginable respect. Many
previously convicted persons have been extirpated quite literally from
374
the body politic through mandatory disenfranchisement statutes.
The vast majority were poor when they entered the criminal justice
system and are unlikely to have gained financial stature upon
exiting.375 Even the very fact that these technologies can zero in on
particular groups may increase the societal stigma they suffer, further
diminishing their political salience. It is hard to imagine a
constituency eager to coalesce under the banner of the Registered
Sex Offenders Political Action Committee. And even if one did, it is
harder still to imagine such a group carrying much political sway.
Moreover, even if targeted groups were able to surmount the
handicap of their countermajoritarian posture, the unaccountability
and invisibility that characterize technological restraints make the

intrusively stopped by police and the much broader, more powerful class of people whose fear
of privacy invasions is related not to criminal justice but to intrusive government more
generally.”).
372. Dripps, supra note 363, at 1088–89 (offering explanation of public choice failures in
criminal justice context).
373. Weisberg, supra note 362, at 135–36 (observing that even white collar suspects and
defendants have minimal political clout); see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR 70–78, 109–10 (2007) (describing the emergence of crime control as a salient
topic for attaining political power due to the general lack of opposition).
374. George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1897–98 (1999).
375. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (finding that roughly
82 percent of state defendants and 66 percent of federal felony defendants are indigent).
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exercise of democratic power an all the more unlikely means of
cabining their use. Ordinary policing already contains a fair amount
376
of “low visibility discretion” that is difficult to regulate—an officer
patrolling the highway chooses which of many speeding cars to stop,
or which of many offenders to arrest and charge.
Technological restraints pose even greater obstacles. A person
detained is indisputably material; the state’s action is difficult to hide
or obscure. But individuals under surveillance may not even know
that their liberty has been compromised. No alert sounds when a
name is entered into a computer-records search, database, or online
377
index. The 70,000 fans at the so-called Tampa snooperbowl
undoubtedly rooted for their teams without feeling any sense of
personal intrusion. Even the nineteen innocent fans questioned might
not have known why they were singled out, or had much by way of
recourse for their troubles. Bluntly stated, it is a lot easier for the
government to obscure the existence—much less the contents—of a
government database than it is a physical prison. And because
technological restraints emanate from so many different sources of
state authority, even a vigilant individual may not know where, or
how broadly, to look. If the population at large is simply unaware of a
measure, it is less capable of organizing politically to regulate it.
It might be argued that this lack of awareness reflects the
negligibility of the harm. Yet just because you did not know that your
zipper is down does not mean that your privacy was not compromised
when everyone saw your underpants. More importantly, although the
throngs of fans at the ball game may not feel any ill effects, the
378
nineteen individuals stopped on that occasion —and perhaps
stopped every time they attend the game or board a plane or drive on
a highway—unquestionably suffer a harm. Yet the ability of
technology to isolate them from the masses, and singularly visit the
harm on that minority, renders them politically less powerful.
Furthermore, the concern is not just that technological control
can be easily exercised surreptitiously, but also that it need not even
be wielded exclusively by the state. The unaccountability of

376. ELY, supra note 335, at 97.
377. The term was apparently coined by Republican House Majority Leader Dick Armey in
reference to the face-recognition technology used at the Super Bowl. Rachel Konrad, Airport
Security Technology Under Scrutiny, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 12, 2001, http://www.news.
com/2100-1001-272938.html.
378. See supra note 100.
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technological restraints, which can be delegated to third parties,
renders them impervious to political control. When the state
incarcerates an individual, it assumes clear responsibility for the
welfare of that person. Failures in health care, safety, and general
well-being, however common, fall within in the state’s domain. But
the government, though causally connected to the misappropriation
or misuse of forms of technological restraint, may nonetheless not be
directly accountable for it. In other words, even assuming that the Sex
Offender Political Action Committee succeeded in curtailing the
scope of sex registry requirements, it would have no one to lobby to
address the problem of private expressions of violence, bias, or
discrimination.
Lastly, it is worth noting that to the extent that new technologies
may be difficult to grasp due to their technical nature or fast-changing
quality, those concerns are outweighed by the particular expertise of
courts in dealing with questions of state power and due process.
Although courts may not be the optimal branch for understanding the
nuances of a technology’s operation, they remain the preferred locus
for checking governmental, particularly majority-driven, overreaching
and abuse. Whereas deference to legislative and executive judgments
on the use and deployment of new technologies might be warranted
when such measures apply indiscriminately across the population,
such deference is inappropriate when the state acts against the
targeted few in the name of the safety of the many.
In sum, the very qualities that differentiate technological
restraints from their physical counterparts—their capacity to
proliferate, accumulate, be delegated, and impose contingent harms—
counsel in favor of greater, not lesser, intervention by the judicial
branch. Moreover, the targeted nature of these restraints further
reinforces the need for a constitutional check on legislative or
executive excess.
B. The Shape of Constitutional Regulation
Having accepted the novel challenges presented by technologies
of restraint and the need for courts to exercise some oversight
authority in their implementation, it remains to ask what form such
supervision might take. It is not enough to categorically preclude
their use on the theory that the risks outweigh the benefits. In many
cases, the use of a technological restraint offers an attractive
alternative (for both the state and the individual) to some more
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severe regulatory regime. Conversely, however, this Article has
endeavored to show that neither can it suffice to proceed on the
current path, which largely treats these new technologies as simply
less intrusive alternatives to physical restraint and wholly defers to
legislative and executive judgments about the kind of process, if any,
that should circumscribe their use.
To the extent that jails were once treated as a physical space
accessible only after the government surmounted high hurdles of
criminal process, the Court’s rulings on regulatory incapacitation
have devitalized that ideal. But that is no reason to assume that the
landscape of regulatory restraints should automatically be considered
free terrain. The diversity of available restraints suggests that, rather
than the current dichotomous regime that focuses exclusively on the
distinction between civil and criminal (or regulatory and punitive)
measures, a more nuanced approach might be warranted. Different
restraints effectuate different deprivations of liberty, and the
continuum along which those deprivations spread in turn informs the
determination of the appropriate degree of regulation.
The questions asked and answers given by application of the
Mendoza-Martinez test prove too blunt an instrument for the
subtleties of technological regulation. Requiring full criminal process
for measures labeled “punitive” exacts a steep cost for what may be
fairly nonrestrictive impositions. The “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test can similarly be too zero-sum: either an action requires a
warrant and probable cause or nothing at all.379 Setting such high
stakes only incentivizes courts to ignore the real liberty concerns
raised by technological restraints. As a result, many of these intrusive
measures go effectively unregulated.
Rather than force a choice between providing full criminal
process or else invalidating a sex registry requirement or DNA
collection program, the law should carve some space for a more finely
granulated assessment of a particular restraint’s validity. Such an
inquiry would ask questions aimed at ensuring the procedural

379. The Supreme Court has increasingly exhibited resistance to this dichotomous
formulation, and has slowly created a variation on the kind of nuanced inquiry advanced here.
Although the Court remains reluctant to eschew its “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, it
has carved out a sliding scale of procedural safeguards, measured in terms of “reasonableness”
for a variety of special circumstances. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General
Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 129 (1989)
(observing trend); see also Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, supra note 368, at 1018–19 (reviewing
contradictory doctrines).
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safeguards necessary to superintend its use rather than simply to
classify it into a prefabricated and Manichean typology for an idea of
restraint that belongs to a different time. Measures merit particularly
close scrutiny when they: (a) target a particular class, (b) on the basis
of the asserted dangerous character of individuals in that class, (c) in
the name of the safety of the general public.380
This formulation intends to isolate measures least amenable to
democratic accountability. By looking to provisions applicable only to
particular subgroups—based on character or status rather than
behavior or activity—this initial inquiry zeroes in on those measures
most likely to raise legitimate constitutional concerns rather than
merely reflect differing policy preferences. It also offsets the concerns
raised by the unaccountability and invisibility of restraint
mechanisms; if the government is to label certain persons as
dangerous to the public at large or subject them to particular burdens
of surveillance, then heightened scrutiny is essential to ensure that
such labeling and its concomitant exposure is warranted.
Under conventional analysis, due process and equal protection
are the two doctrines most readily adapted to the task of
constitutionally regulating targeted technological restraints.381 Equal
protection analysis ensures that the boundaries delimiting those
targeted by such restraints are narrowly and justifiably drawn; due
process guarantees that those within those boundaries do in fact
legitimately belong there. In addition, rather than wholesale forbid or
approve the use of technological restraints, both analyses could
provide a constitutional review that encourages the government to
exercise its power narrowly and judiciously rather than broadly and
haphazardly.
Reconceiving the nature of targeted technologies aids in
understanding how such scrutiny might first be triggered. With
respect to the Equal Protection Clause, numerous theories support

380. Such a purpose might be ascertained from the context surrounding the measure’s
implementation, from express statements by the enacting officials, or even inferred from the
nature of the measure itself.
381. Although it may at first glance seem odd to discuss both doctrines almost
interchangeably, the reality of their relative applications reveal that they are in fact closely
related. As Professor Laurence Tribe wrote with reference to the substantive aspect of the due
process clause, “due process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and
entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.” Laurence H.
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
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heightened scrutiny of such restraints. As argued in this Article,
technological restraints target and affect precisely the kind of
382
“discrete and insular minorit[y]” that lack political protection and
burden a host of fundamental rights. But even absent express appeal
to the doctrine of strict scrutiny, a meaningful application of a lesser
standard of review might go far to uncover irrationalities in the
“physics” of such restraints as described in Part III. Recall that Justice
Souter, writing separately in Connecticut Department of Public Safety
v. Doe and joined by Justice Ginsburg, raised the possibility that the
broad lines drawn by the sex offender registration statute potentially
raised equal protection problems.383 And the Court has held that
“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable . . . are not permissible bases” for
distinguishing one subpopulation from another.384
With respect to due process, dissipating the cloud of the physical
paradigm reveals a range of important liberty interests that arguably
even draw support from unexpected corners. For instance, the
385
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Morales can be read
as essentially acknowledging an interest in negative liberty for
isolated subgroups in that the Court invalidated on vagueness
grounds an ordinance that vested law enforcement with targeted
authority to disperse gatherings that included alleged gang
members.386 Recognizing what the plurality termed the “attribute of
personal liberty” known as the “right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination,” the Court found that the ordinance
granted too much discretion to law enforcement to intrude upon the
387
lawful activity of citizens. This liberty interest—which the dissenters
derisively called a “Fundamental Freedom to Loiter”388—was in part
described as relevant to the right to be in a chosen place; yet it more
fundamentally protected a notion of freedom that is not so much

382. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also Ben Geiger,
Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders As a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1216–
30 (2006) (arguing that ex-offenders constitute a “suspect class” for Equal Protection purposes
and refuting arguments against such treatment on grounds of either moral blameworthiness or
constitutional approbation of disenfranchisement of ex-offenders).
383. Conn. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
384. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
385. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
386. Id. at 64.
387. Id. at 53 (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
388. Id. at 84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

02__MURPHY.DOC

1404

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1321

about physical restraint, but rather about the freedom to make those
389
choices without (unjustified) interference from the state.
Support for a cognizable liberty interest might also be drawn
from cases recognizing the propriety of due process review of
outpatient commitment statutes. Although typically framed as a
390
fundamental right to refuse medical care, the adequacy of the
process accorded by such statutes presumably does not turn upon
whether the prescribed treatment was a physical invasion of the body
via psychotropic medicine or a non-physical invasion of liberty in the
form of mandatory attendance at weekly groups. Indeed, in
Youngberg v. Romeo,391 the Supreme Court acknowledged that even
involuntarily committed persons retain liberty interests in “freedom
of movement” and “freedom from bodily restraint” beyond the initial
commitment decision to include the manner in which they are
392
restrained within that commitment. In Youngberg, the Court
determined that the unreasonable imposition of physical restraints
violated the Due Process Clause.393
Once triggered, both doctrines ask questions of the kind most
familiar to courts, and with which courts have great familiarity. An
equal protection inquiry considers whether an action is “narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest,”394 or alternatively,
“bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”395 A due process
396
claim can sweep quite broadly, but a procedural due process claim
typically inquires into:

389. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. . . . Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct.”).
390. See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482–83 (N.Y. 2004) (framing the issue seemingly, but
ambiguously, as such under state constitution). The Supreme Court, for its part, has recognized
a liberty interest in “avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003).
391. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
392. Id. at 319.
393. Id. at 310, 322.
394. Geiger, supra note 382, at 1206 & nn.89–92 (citing cases).
395. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
396. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981) (“[D]ue process is not a
technical conception with a fixed content,” and thus “[a]pplying the Due Process Clause is . . .
an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a
particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the
several interests that are at stake.” (citations omitted)).

02__MURPHY.DOC

2008]

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

PARADIGMS OF RESTRAINT

1405

[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
397
requirement would entail.

How then, might review of technological restraints proceed, mindful
of their particular qualities? Eradication of a physical paradigm to
invoke the relevant review is only half the battle; an adequate
execution of that review also requires dislodging the conventions of
the physical paradigm.
Importantly, both equal protection and due process involve
inquiries into the tailoring—either to a class or to an individual—of a
provision as measured against the government’s interests. This is the
essential question to ask of a technological restraint, and also the one
398
least articulated in prevailing forms of review. Although physical
incapacitation is necessarily bimodal, technological restraints can
operate in finer degrees that must be measured in terms of their
efficacy and intrusiveness. Thus, they warrant greater sensitivity to
the manner of their application. Specifically, courts should examine
the nexus between the purpose and the population restrained; the
duration, repetition, or longevity of the restraint’s application; the
demonstrated efficacy of the particular restraint; the existence of less
intrusive alternatives; and the degree to which the technique is
amenable to external constraints impeding its abuse. Each individual
factor can first be judged along a spectrum and then considered in
constellation to determine the measure’s constitutionality.
Thus, for instance, a measure that has a loose nexus between its
purpose and population, operates indefinitely and repetitively, has
not been proven efficacious, compounds other forms of restraint,
could be achieved through less restrictive means, and is difficult to
check or safeguard against abuse would be presumptively

397. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
398. But cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing
that the state’s “failure to consider, or to use, ‘alternative and less harsh methods’ to achieve a
nonpunitive objective can help show that the legislature’s ‘purpose . . . was to punish’”).
Professor Christopher Slobogin has proposed a series of principles to govern preventive
incapacitation determinations, derived from a variety of cases espousing similar values.
Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 48–58 (2003).
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impermissible. To the contrary, a measure applied to a narrow and
select population, that operates for a short period of time and on an
infrequent basis, is proven highly effective, is the only means of
achieving its goal, and is readily amenable to public scrutiny or check
would be presumptively acceptable. Many measures will fall
somewhere in between, but this inquiry proffers a set of optimal
values that such techniques ought to aspire to embody, and which are
designed to counter the concerns outlined in Part III.
First, assessing the nexus between a restraint’s purpose and its
targeted population helps counter both the proliferation and
accumulation tendencies of technological restraints and also
minimizes the risks of unaccountability and invisibility. For instance,
consider GPS tracking requirements. If the purpose of such
requirements is to protect the public from reoffending sex offenders,
then they should be tailored to those offenders for whom real-time
location information operates as an effective form of apprehension or
deterrence. A regulation drawn so generally that it sweeps in a sex
offender whose behavior demonstrates a propensity toward molesting
family members or engaging in consensual but underage sexual
activity therefore is overly broad: it includes individuals for whom
location information serves no useful purpose.
This defect would not render it immediately unconstitutional: if
such tracking was imposed for only a short period, was demonstrably
effective, and constituted the only means of achieving the safety goal,
for instance, it might nonetheless withstand challenge. But otherwise,
invalidating such a provision would ensure that the ease of imposing
such requirements do not cause them to proliferate, especially in light
of real concerns about third-party violence or impediments to
personal liberty. Poorly drawn requirements also suggest that goals
other than those proffered by the government are animating the
399
determination to impose the restraint. For instance, a sex offender
registry that provides general information about the location or
appearance of a particular offender is more readily defensible than
one that gives unnecessarily specific details likely to serve no purpose
other than to arouse private violence.

399. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (observing that statutes that impose “a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group” are unconstitutional, in part because the
“sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that . . . [it] seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
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Second, restraints that operate for long periods of time or impose
repetitive burdens or encumbrances on the regulated population
deserve greater scrutiny than those imposed on a onetime basis or for
shorter periods of time. Consider, for example, a sex offender
registration requirement. A requirement that an individual register
once should be treated differently than a requirement to update
registration on a quarterly basis. And a requirement that individuals
register for five years deserves different analysis than one that they
register for life. Similarly, a DNA sample kept in a national database
during a window of time in which an individual is most likely to
reoffend deserves different consideration than one that remains after
a long period of time has passed or even the person’s death. Such
review helps counter the accumulation concern because techniques
that operate in a shorter window are less likely to bump up against
other methods of control. Shorter operational periods and fewer
repetitive intrusions likewise diminish the proliferation and
unaccountability concerns. Because only those applications that score
high on the other factors will survive scrutiny, the state will have an
incentive to be particular about whom it subjects to the longest and
most invasive forms of surveillance.
Third, review should look for evidence that a regulatory restraint
actually achieves its stated purpose. Technological restraints impinge
important interests in the name (usually) of public safety.
Accordingly, a highly efficacious measure might garner strong
support for its continued application, perhaps even if applied against
a large subpopulation for an extended period of time. Conversely, an
inefficacious or error-prone measure should raise a red flag even if
targeted fairly narrowly. In simple terms, courts should ask how
effectively the restraint as imposed is at accomplishing what it is
purports to accomplish. Acknowledging the harms wrought by
technological restraints necessarily carries with it the responsibility to
concentrate the visitation of that harm only where needed. Whereas a
largely inefficacious restraint might nonetheless be justified as briefly
imposed on a very narrow class of persons, the same restraint should
not be permitted to apply more broadly.
Moreover, rather than rely upon speculative assessments that a
particular technology achieves a particular goal, courts should
demand evidence of its capacity to achieve its stated purpose. Thus
far, courts have proven far too reluctant to question the effectiveness
of a technological restraint. In assessing the benefit to “public safety”
advanced by sex offender registries, for instance, the Supreme Court
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observed no more than that there existed a “high rate of recidivism
400
among convicted sex offenders.” The Court then concluded that
requiring sex offenders to register was therefore “reasonable.”401
There was no discussion, much less evidence, about whether
registration in any way reduced recidivism or worked to prevent
future victimization. The Court did not examine key aspects of the
registry—in terms of its reporting requirements and notification
provisions—to determine whether they each supported that ultimate
purpose. Such an inquiry would likely have proved fruitful: many
registries are in fact drawn in such broad terms and contain such large
quantities of poorly distinguished data that they are virtually useless
to the general population.402 If a concerned individual runs a search of
offenders in the neighborhood that turns up fifty people in a five-mile
radius, entirely unsorted by whether they actually pose any danger,
then the provision simply fails to safeguard the public adequately
while imposing a serious restriction on liberty.
Likewise, courts across the board have deemed collection and
retention of DNA samples as serving “society’s enormous interest in
403
404
reducing recidivism” or “solving crimes.” Yet courts fail to
substantiate either of those claimed interests with actual data
demonstrating the efficacy of widespread DNA collection, either in
terms of cases closed, convictions secured, or crimes deterred.405 Even
if a court were to accept that DNA typing has proven effective at
linking convicted offenders to old, current, or future cases, then that
conclusion still only supports the continued collection of genetic
profiles from the convicted offender population. No evidence

400. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003).
401. See id.
402. For instance, a search of the California sex offender registry for a two-mile radius
around the University of California at Berkeley School of Law turned up over 30 offenders. See
Office of the Attorney Gen., California Megan’s Law, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008). Clicking the “address” box and then entering the search terms “2240
Piedmont Ave.” in Berkeley, CA 94720 returns a map with dots indicating registered offenders.
Clicking for individual information gives a photograph, name, address, and other identifying
information—but gives only the code provision of conviction (making it difficult to determine
the factual underpinnings of the offense) and no sense of how long ago the conviction occurred.
403. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
404. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668 (2d Cir. 2005).
405. In fact, most data on the efficacy of DNA testing appears to demonstrate its ability to
exculpate offenders in specific cases. See Frederick R. Bieber, Turning Base Hits into Earned
Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Data Bank Programs, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 222, 222 (2006) (noting that statistics on DNA’s effectiveness are urgently needed).

02__MURPHY.DOC

2008]

5/27/2008 1:44:55 PM

PARADIGMS OF RESTRAINT

1409

supports the need for the continued retention of genetic samples by
406
the government or for broader collection provisions. Indeed, when a
hit occurs in a database and the individual is apprehended, a new set
407
of DNA samples is typically taken for confirmatory purposes. Given
the infringement on liberty—both in the positive and negative
senses—represented by the government storage of an individual’s
entire genetic code, and the lack of a justification for keeping it, that
requirement of the restraint should be parsed out from the general
regime and invalidated as suspect.
Factoring in evidence of efficacy helps counter the proliferation,
invisibility, unaccountability, and accumulation tendencies of restraint
technologies. Without any measure of efficacy and absent a
constituency capable of holding legislatures accountable, such
restraints can easily propagate unchecked. The invisibility of the
harms—in that they are visited only upon the population that must
endure the burdens of the restraint—makes ordinary accountability
difficult.
Fourth, as a corollary of the requirement that courts factor the
efficacy of restraint techniques into an assessment of their
constitutionality, courts should also ask whether the restraint in
question is the least restrictive means of achieving a stated goal. Such
an inquiry directly checks the proliferation and accumulation
tendencies of new technological restraints: the government can only
justify a broadly applicable set of restraints applied cumulatively
upon the same individual if it can show that all are essential
components of its overarching goal. Thus, if applying the restraint to
a smaller set of individuals, or for a lesser amount of time or in a
different manner than that contemplated would achieve the same
ends, that lesser restriction should govern. Similarly, a court might
determine that a measure that does not provide procedures for review
or lifting of the restraint is more restrictive than necessary.
The last factor inquires into the capacity of particular individuals
to challenge a requirement that they submit ab initio to a particular

406. Rather, speculation regarding the success of collection and retention apparently
sufficed. Of course, this is even so as documented evidence of malfeasance and misuse of DNA
samples is dismissed as “conjecture.” Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669.
407. See, e.g., Am. Prosecutors Research Inst., DNA Evidence Policy Considerations for the
Prosecutor, http://www.dna.gov/audiences/officers_court/policy_prosecutor/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2008) (advising prosecutors in a cold-hit case to “review[] the viability of the case before law
enforcement obtains a confirmation DNA sample from the subject”).
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restraint—including whether there exists any opportunity to remove
oneself from the class. As noted, technological restraints typically
elude the economics of the physical world and often operate largely
invisibly. They likewise are delegable and prone to proliferation and
accumulation. To the extent that external forces can cabin their
potential abuse, the courts need not act as vigorously in supervising
their deployment. The degree to which a technological restraint
contains either endogenous or exogenous constraints on its use
should sensibly influence a court’s receptiveness to its terms.
Regulations that include individualized process, or even the
opportunity to opt out of a generally drawn class through a particular
showing, should be far more likely to withstand challenge than one
408
that draws broad categorical lines based solely upon status.
For instance, if the government compiles a database—whether of
DNA, names for a no-fly list, or biometric images of “suspicious”
persons—and then permits parties to access or challenge that
database for errors or oversights, then its use in a closed system of
regulatory restraint may be justified as appropriately safeguarded.
But the same database, if impermeable to challenge or inspection in
any reasonable way, should cause a court pause. Similarly, a sex
offender registry that requires mandatory lifetime listing—with no
provisions to demonstrate either that an individual is incapable of
causing the harm contemplated (for instance, a comatose individual)
or unlikely to cause such harm (for instance, has not offended for
many years)—should be greeted with suspicion. Broadly drawn,
indefinite regulatory restraints are the equivalent of technological
“life sentences,” and like their physical counterparts, they should be
reserved only for cases of utmost and demonstrable need.
CONCLUSION
In 1987, only six Supreme Court Justices could agree that the
Constitution countenanced the preventive jailing of persons charged
by probable cause with a narrow category of dangerous crimes and
found by a judge after an adversarial hearing to pose a clear and
409
convincing danger to the community. Twenty years later, eight
408. This is also consistent with the historically disfavored category of status offenses. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (finding it a violation of due process and
cruel and unusual punishment to punish an individual for being addicted to narcotics).
409. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987) (noting flight risk also justifies
detention).
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Justices agreed that a statute that requires people to report for the
rest of their lives each time that they change hair color does not even
410
invoke any constitutional scrutiny. Courts around the country
demonstrate the same indifference toward requirements that
individuals give biological samples for government retention or attach
lifetime tracking devices to human beings.
Justice Brandeis presciently urged long ago that the Constitution
retain the “capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”411 Just as new
communication technologies prompted Fourth Amendment doctrine
412
so too do new
to shift its focus to “people, not places,”
incapacitation technologies require renewed reckoning with societal
understandings of what it means to deprive liberty. There may one
day come a time when incapacitation no longer requires physical
restraint: instead of using bricks and mortar to keep the dangerous in
check, the government may rely upon microchips and face scans, the
Internet and DNA. If that day comes to pass, then it will be up to
every individual to ensure that American ideals of liberty have kept
pace with technological innovations and to relinquish at last the
image of the jail as the paradigmatic form of restraint.

410. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 1 (2003).
411. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
412. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

